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Gruenberg, James R. M.A., Department of History, Wright State University, 2012. The 
Yellow Fever Epidemic in Savannah, Georgia in 1876: A Case for Applied Historical 
Analysis. 
 
Yellow fever was a constant and deadly visitor to the southern United States since the 
middle of the seventeenth century. Dying of yellow fever was gruesome and terrifying. 
Black vomit was the prominent symptom as the patient bled to death internally and 
externally. Yellow fever, or ‘yellow jack’ to the locals, would bring Savannah, Georgia to 
its knees on three different occasions. In 1876, however, the city would lose a full 6% of 
its population, or 1,066 souls. This thesis argues that this tragic outbreak was preventable, 
and that the physical conditions that were well known to contribute to yellow fever 
spread were present in Savannah and ignored by city officials who succumbed to 
economic hardship and a desire for increased commerce. If this epidemic was 
preventable, then it has potential to inform modern community decision-makers by 
applying lessons of the past to present policy and practice. To defend this argument, this 
thesis will discuss the physical, social, and politico-economic conditions in Savannah that 
contributed to the outbreak and the decisions that marginalized the yellow fever threat. 
Also, the thesis will discuss applied historical analysis in theoretical terms and identify a 
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When an adult learner takes on the adventure of a master’s degree, two 
consequences are bound to occur. First, he will take on the challenge with a passion 
rather than as a mere academic requirement, and second, his family will invariably 
become drawn into the process. Both certainly occurred in my case. These two 
consequences, bound together, formed a two-and-a-half-year expression of love from my 
family toward me as I spent countless hours engrossed in a constant battle to excel.  
I first, therefore, express my love to my wife and kids who went without a 
husband and dad for a long time. I love you. You have allowed me the honor of learning 
without the expectation of anything in return. I now honor you with this degree. You 
deserve it more than I do.  
I also express my gratitude to the faculty of the History Department who were 
willing to look past the clumsy naïveté of the old guy who wanted to get an advanced 
degree. They accepted my passion and allowed me the privilege to learn from them. I will 
never forget the words of Dr. Sean Pollock, the first victim of my degree pursuits. 
Holding my final paper in his hand, painted in red ink, he kindly said, “Jim, your final 
grade is actually ironic.” It was an A, by the way, but he was right; it was ironic. This 
‘rigorous kindness,’ as I’ll call it, was the rule for each and every faculty I encountered 
on my journey. Thanks to your collective tutelage, I have matured as a learner, and 
certainly as a writer. Thank you for the rigor and for the kindness. 
I would also like to thank my thesis director, Dr. Jonathan Winkler, who accepted 
my unique academic focus and understood its efficacy. His guidance during my 
Independent Readings experience, which formed much of the rationale for this thesis, 
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was formative for me as I strove to challenge current paradigms. The books he gave me 
as a reading list are now permanent fixtures in my personal library. His willingness to go 
beyond the bounds of what’s expected and connect me with various people who he 
thought could help me was appreciated and valuable. I look forward to sustaining that 
relationship as I move past my degree and into the future. 
My thesis committee, selected based on their academic focus, each contributed to 
my learning experience in important ways. Of note, Dr. John Flach, Professor and Chair 
of the Department of Psychology, was instrumental in introducing me to Clausewitz, 
Sumida and the notion of applied history.  
The staff at the Georgia Historical Society archives was fantastic. This excellent 
collection is well kept and managed, and they were very helpful and informative. 
Similarly, the archivists at the City of Savannah’s archives were very generous with their 
time and allowed me to uncover documents that greatly influenced my thesis, namely the 
court case against Dr. James J. Waring. Touching these original documents was 
indescribable and helped me taste the thrill of the historian. Finally, the staff of Wright 
State University’s Dunbar Library is second to none. The human and material resources 
there allowed my pursuit to flourish, and their patience was needed and appreciated 
during those long hours. 
I enter the realm of a novice historian with a humble spirit. I look forward to the 
day when my skills of analysis, and writing, will reach higher levels. Learning will 
always be a process for me, however, and all of the people who I acknowledge here have 




As dawn broke across the lowcountry marshes of the Savannah River on the 
morning of August 21, 1876, little did the residents of the bustling port of Savannah, 
Georgia suspect that death would soon engulf them. James Cleary would be the first to 
fall victim to yellow fever. A poor twelve-year-old boy, Cleary lived with his family on a 
small cul de sac named Wright Street; a street notorious for poor living conditions and 
visitation by foreign sailors in port. On August 23, The Savannah Morning News, in an 
attempt to suppress panic over disease outbreaks, listed his cause of death as “congestive 
fever.”1 The autopsy, performed within two hours of his death, was indisputable.2 Dr. 
T.O. Somers of Nashville and Dr. Chevis of Savannah chronicled the horrific details of a 
yellow fever autopsy. Their record describes that “the blood thick, non-coagulable, and 
denuded of all its albumen, is dammed black upon the walls of the intestines… the 
spleen… is enormously hypertrophied… the gall bladder filled with a stringy 
substance.”3 The gruesome autopsy clearly identified the cause of Cleary’s death as 
yellow fever, which “unlike any other disease, carried a mysterious horror to it. Its attack 
was acute, its duration painful.”4  
The best doctors or scientists did not yet know that the Aedes aegypti, the 
common mosquito, was hard at work biting the sick and healthy and spreading the yellow 
                                                
1 Savannah Morning News, August 23, 1876, p. 3, column 5. 
2 Woodhull, Alfred A., MD. “On the Causes of the Epidemic of Yellow Fever at 
Savannah, Georgia in 1876.” The American Journal of the Medical Sciences (n.p.), no. 
CXLVII (July 1877): 25. 
3 The British Medical Journal, "The Morbid Anatomy of Yellow Fever," The British 
Medical Journal (BMJ Publishing Group) 1, no. 951 (March 1879): 434. 
4 Molly Caldwell Crosby, The American Plague: The Untold Story of Yellow Fever, the 
Epidemic that Shaped Our History (New York: Berkley Books, 2006), 61. 
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fever virus around the city. The disease was quickly found in all quarters and among all 
classes. Interestingly, there were no cases found outside the city limits. Even a large 
orphanage, located close to the city limits, was not affected.  
In the days leading up to August 21, mild symptoms of fevers were reported. 
These symptoms, such as frontal headache, pains in the extremities, and abdominal 
lethargy, were being handled by the local doctors and not raising any alarms. This phase 
of the disease, however, would be short lived. Local physician, Dr. Louis A. Falligant, 
reported “The advance in the type of disease from the milder… to the malignant and 
typhoid, was so rapid in different localities that I at once advised my friends that in my 
opinion we were on the threshold of a pestilence more terrible than that which had 
devastated our fair community in 1854!”5 Falligant was correct; its spread was wild and 
erratic and would eclipse any outbreak to date. 
Yellow fever rapidly permeated Savannah. Panic ensued. Thousands fled the city 
for refuge in the countryside or with relatives in safer climates.6 Physicians were soon 
overwhelmed. Many of its victims were left to die, or to be cared for by one of the few 
benevolent societies at work in the city. Backlogs of burials became a problem. At the 
height of the outbreak, bodies were stacked at the gates of the cemeteries awaiting burial, 
adding to the horror of the event. By the middle of November, after the disease had run 
                                                
5 Louis A. Falligant, A Monograph on the Yellow Fever of 1876 in Savannah, Georgia 
(1878; repr., Danvers, MA: General Books, 2009), 7. 
6 James J. Waring, The Epidemic at Savannah, 1876: Its Causes and Measures of 
Prevention, Adopted by the Municipality During the Administartion of Hon. J.F. Wheaton 
(Savannah, GA: Morning News Steam Printing House, 1879), 161. 
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its course, Savannah buried 1,066 of its citizens in its already full cemeteries and reeled 
from a tragedy that shook the community to its core. 7  
This thesis argues that the yellow fever outbreak in Savannah, Georgia in 1876 
was preventable. This indictment is humbling to this writer who is obligated to reveal 
evidence against a city government that is unable to defend itself. The evidence, however, 
is indisputable: officials of the City of Savannah failed to take action against the signs of 
disaster that had emerged and willfully ignored practices that could have fended off the 
epidemic. Physical, social, political, and economic conditions of Savannah, on the eve of 
this epidemic, will be examined to defend this argument. Each will reveal that factors 
were in place that made Savannah ripe for a yellow fever disaster, that those factors were 
recognizable and understood by the community, and that segments of the city’s 
leadership were in a position to recognize the threat but did little to manage it. 
 There are two purposes for pursuing this argument. First, the body of literature 
concerning the post-reconstruction South should include a focused study of this tragedy. 
Second, with pandemic disease and both natural and man-initiated disasters continuing to 
threaten the world’s population, contemporary community emergency planners can learn 
lessons from Savannah that may prevent the loss of life. History, therefore, can be used to 
provide guidance to the future. 
 The on-going challenge of every historian, is to answer this question: So what? In 
the case of Savannah, Georgia, this is a valid and worthy of examination. Three factors 
call for the study of the yellow fever outbreak in Savannah. First, Savannah was a city of 
                                                
7 Edward C. Anderson, Report of Edward C. Anderson, Mayor of the City of Savannah, 
for the Year Ending December 31, 1876 (Savannah: Geo. N. Nichols’ Steam Printing 
House, 1877), 19. 
 4 
significance and has yet to receive academic attention in relation to the outbreak. Second, 
Savannah’s death toll of 6% puts it at the high end of deaths per capita for yellow fever 
outbreaks during the period. Third, Savannah’s smaller population made it more probable 
that mitigation measures could have been accomplished in reasonable time.  
In contrast to Savannah, New Orleans was easily the greatest bastion of yellow 
fever in eighteenth and nineteenth century America. Located below sea level at the mouth 
of the Mississippi, New Orleans was also blamed for the spread of the fever to other 
Coastal communities. The city was host to many visitors from other Caribbean ports, 
including Havana, Cuba, reputed to be the culprit for America’s yellow fever scourge. Of 
a much greater population than Savannah, New Orleans certainly received, and continues 
to receive, much of the research attention. The yellow fever epidemic of 1853, in New 
Orleans, has been considered the worst attack ever, taking a tenth of its population and 
causing a full 40% to fall ill.8 Modern estimates of the economic impact of this epidemic 
indicate that nearly 45 million dollars were lost between disease related expenditures and 
reduced business revenue.9 Yet despite the primacy of the New Orleans experience in the 
extant literature, Savannah remains an important investigation and worthy of attention 
and should not be overshadowed by seemingly more significant communities. 
Savannah may not have been as populated as New Orleans or Mobile, Alabama, 
but in the nineteenth century Savannah was the third busiest cotton port in America and a 
major transportation hub for commerce throughout the South, the Caribbean, and the rest 
of the U.S. Its prominence as an Atlantic port placed Savannah in the center of the debate 
                                                
8 John Duffy, “Yellow Fever in the Continental United States During the Nineteenth 
Century,” Bulletin of the New York Academy of Medicine 44, no. 6 (June 1968), vii. 
9 David K. Paterson, “Yellow Fever Epidemics and Mortality in the United States,” 
Social Science and Medicine 34, no. 8 (April 1992), 863. 
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over Cuba’s liability in the yellow fever problem. Likewise, the city’s connection with 
the railroads makes it a target of investigation because the control of disease was critical 
to transportation success. Also, fear of disease inhibited travel into the area as well as the 
delivery of goods from an area that was potentially the source of yellow fever 
importation. 
As widespread as the disease was during the period, individual cases such as 
Savannah’s warrant attention. Local conditions were different and unique, and thus 
cannot be generalized along with the larger cities. Scholars have named Savannah among 
the hardest hit cities on the Eastern seaboard along with such notorious yellow fever 
cities as New Orleans and Mobile, AL.10 
Another reason for examining this outbreak is that the per capita death rate in 
Savannah was high compared to other outbreaks during the period, with a rate put at 
between 6% and 13%. In contrast, the 1870 outbreak in New Orleans only took the lives 
of between 1 and 2% of the population.11 Savannah’s epidemic of 1820 took a full 15% 
of the population.12 Considering that the 1876 percentile does not include those who fell 
ill but did not succumb, which is closer to 50%, this epidemic certainly warrants specific 
attention.13  
Savannah’s smaller size, in comparison to other notable yellow fever hot spots, 
indicates a higher likelihood of city administration’s capacity to take care of the problem. 
Simply stated, prevention is more possible when a smaller bureaucracy manages city 
                                                
10 Martha Carolyn Mitchell, “Health and the Medical Profession in the Lower South,” 
The Journal of Southern History 10, no. 4 (November 1944): 426. 
11 Paterson, 860. 
12 Ibid., 861. 
13 This discrepancy is unsolved. The Annual Mayor’s Report for the year 1876 put the 
death rate at 6%, however, local physician Dr. James J. Waring claims 13%. 
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resources. Today, a full twenty percent of America’s population resides in incorporated 
communities of 30,000 inhabitants or less, thereby making Savannah’s experience 
important in the protection of a sizable number of U.S. citizens today.14 Drilling down 
into the decision-points of a small city such as Savannah provides excellent data for much 
of today’s cities of similar population. 
The body of literature on the topic of Savannah’s yellow fever epidemic is small. 
This paper seeks to fill this void in two ways. First, it seeks to single out Savannah’s 
experience in 1876 as unique and worthy of specific examination apart from other yellow 
fever cities. Second, it seeks to provide an exemplar of disaster history by conducting a 
scholarly examination of a historical tragedy that can be used to inform contemporary 
emergency management planners and community decision-makers. 
Several secondary monographs address yellow fever during this period and 
mention characteristics of the Savannah outbreak, but fail to isolate Savannah for focused 
examination. These works can be divided into two groups. Those that focus on the yellow 
fever disease, and second, those that focus on Savannah’s history. Both groups will 
mention Savannah, or mention the epidemic of 1876, but neither provides adequate 
contextual data that frames decisions made in relation to the outbreak.  
An excellent example of scholarship is Molly Caldwell Crosby’s work, The 
American Plague: The Untold Story of Yellow Fever, the Epidemic that Changed Our 
                                                
14 Figures based on 2009 figures as derived from the U.S. Census Bureau. This number is 
representative as it assumes that an incorporated community has a government structure 
and services, however, most citizens that live in unincorporated communities (as 
measured by the Census) still have government services in the form of townships or tribal 
authorities. Likely, this number is conservative. 
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History.15 Crosby examines America’s high watermark of yellow fever, namely the 
epidemic of 1878, especially as it struck Memphis and New Orleans. Her background 
material provides excellent insight into the disease at it emerged in the South. Likewise, 
Yellow Fever and the South, by Margaret Humphreys, offers significant data on some of 
the socio-political aspects of yellow fever and the medical debate over its cause and 
spread.16 
Several journal articles also provide valuable information. Lisa L. Denmark’s 
article, “’At the Midnight Hour’: Economic Dilemmas and Harsh Realities in Post-Civil 
War Savannah,” in the Georgia Historical Quarterly, is the only secondary source that 
deals exclusively with the 1876 epidemic.17 Her excellent analysis of the economic 
conditions of Savannah, and how they relate to the epidemic, are well written and easily 
corroborated in the primary documents. Several other articles address components of 
Savannah’s epidemic and other contextual information. Of note, K. David Patterson’s 
“Yellow Fever Epidemics and Mortality in the United States, 1863-1905,” in Phylon, 
provided useful statistical analysis.18 Werner Troesken also published an article in The 
Journal of Economic History. This article titled, “The Limits of Jim Crow: Race and the 
Provision of Water and Sewerage Services in American Cities, 1880-1925,” was helpful 
                                                
15 Molly Caldwell Crosby, The American Plague: The Untold Story of Yellow Fever, the 
Epidemic that Shaped Our History. (New York: Berkley Books, 2006).  
16 Margaret Humphreys, Yellow fever and the South (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press, 1955). 
17 Lisa L. Denmark, “”At the Midnight Hour”: Economic Dilemmas and Harsh Realities 
in Post-Civil War Savannah,” Georgia Historical Quarterly 90, no. 3 (Fall 2006).  
18 David K. Paterson, “Yellow Fever Epidemics and Mortality in the United States,” 
Social Science and Medicine 34, no. 8 (April 1992). 
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in understanding the class and race issues that surrounded Savannah’s drainage 
problems.19 
There is also a lack of literature that are dedicated to scholarly histories of 
disasters or that address applied historical analysis in the domain of disaster history. 
Although it will be shown that military history and military historians have a strong and 
vital place in the execution of modern war, there is no parallel in the civilian sector. 
Several important books call for historical application. The work, Thinking in Time: The 
Uses of History for Decision-Makers, by Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest A. May, has 
obviously influenced this writer.20 Their thoughtful and exhaustive examination of 
specific cases of significant policy decisions, the Cuban missile crisis to name but one, 
forms a compelling how-to manual on how historical analysis should be applied to 
modern circumstance. Jon Tetsuro Sumida’s contribution to applied history, Decoding 
Clausewitz: A New Approach to On War, also brings relevant perspective to the topic as 
he parses Clausewitz’s epic work.21 
Despite the lack of secondary literature specific to the Savannah epidemic, or the 
existence of a body of work that would describe a historical discipline in disaster history, 
the public health and medical sectors have advanced ideas of applied history. This effort 
is noteworthy and additional study should be conducted to establish methodologies that 
                                                
19 Werner Troesken, “The Limits of Jim Crow: Race and the Provision of Water and 
Sewerage Systems in American Cities, 1880-1925,”  The Journal of Economic History 
62, no. 3 (September 2002). 
20 Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for 
Decision-Makers (New York: The Free Press, 1986). 
21 Jon Tetsuro Sumida, Decoding Clauswitz: A New Approach to On War, (Lawrence, 
Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2008).  
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could be applied to the disaster domain much like the military has applied in its historical 
work. 
Although public health does not seem to have developed a historical discipline 
within the field, it has identified the need to apply past events for the purpose of 
developing current policy. In 2001, The Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health 
published an article entitled, “History of Health, a Valuable Tool in Public Health.” The 
authors propose a similar applied historical approach to disease prevention and response. 
They assert, “The use of history in public health highlights the importance of 
contextualizing health problems and contributes decisively to the genesis of a theory of 
the social conditioning of health and disease processes. In other words, it helps to make 
public health experts aware of the complexity of the social, cultural, political and 
economical circumstances that frame each particular case.”22 This excellent article goes 
on to expound on the importance and efficacy of historical understanding to modern 
public health needs. 
The field of medicine has developed a historical arm that writes of great figures in 
medical development and the stories behind clinical breakthroughs. The Journal of the 
History of Medicine and Allied Sciences published an article that highlights the value of 
medical history to modern practice. Titled, “A Kindly, Useful Mentor; Applying the 
History of Medicine to Public Policy,” the author constructs a similar argument toward a 
hybrid approach to medical history – one that “applies history to policy and decision 
                                                
22 E. Perdiquero et al, “History of Health, a Valuable Tool,” The Journal of Epidemiology 
and Community Health 55, no. 9 (September 2001): 668. 
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making (applied history).”23 Here, again, the contextualization of historical events is 
deemed critical form the exploitation of historical data for modern use. This thesis will 
take the groundwork laid in applied historical analysis and look specifically at the 
Savannah epidemic. 
Chapter one will look deeper into the issues that surround applied history. The 
purpose, here, is to allow the reader to better understand why, and how, the Savannah 
story has potential for valuable insight into modern problems. This chapter is not meant 
to distract the reader from the intrinsic value of the Savannah tragedy, but instead to 
empower the reader to view the event through a unique window of opportunity. 
Chapters two and three provide background information about Savannah and 
yellow fever respectively. The reader will be provided adequate context in order to fully 
grasp the significance of the paper’s argument. It is particularly important to understand 
the nuances of yellow fever in order to understand that Savannah’s officials knew 
sufficient facts about the disease in order to manage it effectively. 
Chapter four looks at the natural and man-made physical characteristics of 
Savannah that made it uniquely susceptible to yellow fever and other disease in 1876. It 
was the physical characteristics of the city that provided the environment for yellow fever 
and it was the physical characteristics of the city that could have been controlled to 
manage the threat. 
The ensuing chapters examine the ancillary factors that influenced the city’s 
officials to ignore the threatening physical conditions that made the yellow fever attack 
                                                
23 Phillip M. Teigen, “A Kindly, useful Mentor; Applying the History of Medicine to 
Public Policy,” Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 54, no. 9 (1999): 
355. 
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that much more virulent and deadly. The politico-economic and social characteristics of 
the city, respectively, will identify indices that pointed to disaster. These chapters will 
show how the city’s economic hardship and social constructs were pervasive and greatly 
influenced the city’s administration as it related to potential disaster.  
This paper will coalesce a significant amount of primary documents, and 
appropriate secondary works, into a cohesive picture of the epidemic and the conditions 
that should have warned a city of an impending crisis. This thesis, then, fills an important 
gap. It addresses the need for a focused work on the Savannah epidemic as well as the 
need for a body of work that seeks to inform modernity in critical disaster preparedness 
lessons learned. Although the argument of this thesis is a damning one, the reader should 
conclude that not only is the argument valid, but also that it also provides exciting 
opportunity to allow such a tragedy to foster a new and important historical discipline, 












CHAPTER ONE: APPLIED HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 
 
 Lessons can, and should, be learned from Savannah. It is as easy to oversimplify 
the problem, as it is the solution, but if lessons can be learned, what are they, and how 
should those lessons be discovered and communicated? This chapter will explore the 
issues that surround applied history and reveal a model with which these issues can be 
leveraged to create a valuable body of work. 
The Controversy Over Applied History 
The use of events, such as Savannah’s epidemic, for the purposes of 
contemporary decision-making is controversial. Purists of the historicist model dispute 
the ability, or plausibility, of mining historical events for pragmatic purposes. John Tosh 
states, “History as a disciplined enquiry aims to sustain the widest possible definition of 
memory, and to make the process of recall as accurate as possible, so that our knowledge 
of the past is not confined to what is immediately relevant.”24 Tosh’s statement serves as 
an excellent warning to those who wish to exploit history as a means to further a personal 
agenda. Tosh’s statement serves as a challenge to ensure that any investigation of an 
event in the past be carefully conducted as to avoid “socially motivated 
misrepresentations of the past.”25 That being said, the question begs to be answered: 
should community planners of today learn from the Savannah epidemic? When exploring 
a potential life-threatening condition, can the boundaries of historicism be stretched to 
allow the past to properly inform the present? 
                                                
24  John Tosh, The Pursuit of History: Aims, Methods and New Direstion in the Study of 
Modern History (New York: Pearson Education Limited, 2010), 2. 
25 Ibid., 21. 
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The iconic R.G. Collingwood helps answer this question. As a historical 
philosopher, Collingwood acknowledged the value of history beyond itself. In his 
seminal work, The Idea of History, he elaborates on the extension of history into present 
life. He claims,  
Thus history has a value; its teachings are useful for human life; simply because 
the rhythm of its changes is likely to repeat itself, similar antecedents leading to 
similar consequents; the history of notable events is worth remembering in order 
to serve as a basis for prognostic judgments, not demonstrable but probable, 
laying down not what will happen but what is likely to happen, indicating the 
points of danger in rhythms now going on.26 
 
If determining probability is possible, Savannah offers an opportunity to not only 
examine the tragedy for its own sake, but to provide a window into the future to 
potentially avoid a historical repeat. Accomplishing such application is not an easy task 
and is not without its challenges. 
Pitfalls of Applied History 
 Historical application is not without its pitfalls. Besides raw dishonesty, or the 
attempt by the historian to manipulate the past to proffer a personal agenda, two other 
problems emerge: the inappropriate use of analogy and the reliance on only basic, or 
core, historical data to draw overarching conclusions. 
Analogy is a tool used to connect one event to another. Webster’s Dictionary 
defines analogy as “A form of logical inference, or an instance of it, based on the 
assumption that if two things are know to be alike in some respects, then they must be 
alike in other respects.”27 This tool has potential for good or evil. Used correctly, analogy 
allows a person to sidetrack unnecessary investigation in order to draw a reasonable 
                                                
26 R.G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (New York: Clarendon Press, 1993), 23. 
27 Webster's II: New College Dictionary Third Edition, s.v. “Analogy.” 
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conclusion in a small amount of time. Used incorrectly, it provides an avenue for grave 
error. 
On September 22, 2011, at the 4th Annual CBRNE Symposium, joint sponsored 
by Wright State University and the Air Force Institute of Technology in Dayton, Ohio, a 
U.S. Army radiation expert was asked by the author about the relationship between the 
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant incident, in the aftermath of the earthquake and 
tsunami off the shore of Japan in 2011, and the explosion of the nuclear power plant in 
Chernobyl, Ukraine in 1986. The question was, “Is there sufficient similarity between the 
two incidents whereby the Chernobyl accident could have informed the Fukushima 
Daiichi accident?” The answer was surprising. “No, not really,” said the colonel, “the 
climactic differences alone make the difference.” He went on to explain that the dryer 
Ukraine climate meant that radioactive particles that fell onto the ground, buildings, and 
vegetation was easily re-released into the atmosphere, whereas the wetter Japanese 
climate eliminated that re-release. Also, the cause of the incidents is enough to make a 
clear comparison impossible. This discussion reinforced the fact that inappropriately 
applied analogy, often separated by small but important subtleties, must be avoided for 
applied historical analysis to work properly. 
Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May warn that although history has a unique 
capability to inform contemporary problems, the misapplication of past events can lead to 
problematic outcomes. They argue this from the standpoint of decision-makers who 
normally disregard the historical record altogether. They claim that “debate in serious 
decision situations starts at least nine times out of ten with the question: What do we do? 
Background and context get skipped. The past comes in, if at all, in the form of analogy, 
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with someone speaking of the current situation as like some other.”28 Broad assumptions, 
therefore, can divert attention away from critical dissimilarities. 
 Another pitfall of historical application to present problem solving is the 
overreliance on core or basic historical data that fails to account for contextual analysis. 
This problem has challenged military historians who seek to improve modern strategic 
schema by building a new model that correctly extracts relevant data.  
Jon Tetsuro Sumida and David Alan Rosenberg identify the Navy’s 
oversimplified application of the past to current technology challenges. They claim, 
“given incomplete or overgeneralized understandings… important questions about the 
connections between them have for the most part not even been asked, to say nothing of 
being answered.”29 John B. Hattendorf subtly criticizes the overreliance on basic 
historical information that simply recounts situations and how navies were deployed in 
battle. He acknowledges the work of modern, more enlightened, naval historians who 
“have come to understand that navies and those who serve in uniform do not exist 
separately from other parts of society. In addition to seeing their actions in terms of 
leadership, tactics, and strategy, scholars must also understand them in terms of the 
external environment….”30 
 The improper use of analogy and the exclusive use of basic historical data are 
pitfalls that can each lead to inaccurate and inappropriate applied history. Casting a broad 
comparison between Savannah’s epidemic, the Spanish Flu epidemic in 1918, and a 
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modern flu outbreak, for example, may be completely inappropriate when all of the 
factors are actually examined. All factors that surround an event must be investigated; 
political, economic, physical, and social. Analogies and historical stories may make for 
good reading but may, in fact, threaten the very good it was intended to accomplish: 
eliminating the replaying of the mistakes of the past, in this case, a tragic disease 
epidemic. 
The Appropriate use of Applied History 
Applied historical analysis does have its place and, when used properly, can be of 
tremendous benefit to modern decision-makers. There is not a historian, past or present, 
which would deny the criticality of accuracy in the building of a historical account. Nor, 
is there a layperson that would not believe that learning from the past would not have 
value. The answer lies somewhere in the middle: a rigorous analysis of the past, coupled 
with building a library of case studies that contemporary decision-makers can reference 
in the management of community threat. If the yellow fever epidemic in Savannah in 
1876 has potential to prevent a similar outbreak today, then a full analysis must be made 
that takes into account the breadth of issues that surrounded the event by careful handling 
of primary source information that accurately reflects the event. But how should this be 
accomplished? By combining rigorous investigation of the historical record with a 
comprehensive analysis of context a rich and valuable tool can be written. Military 





Military History as a Model for Applied History 
Military historians have provided a model that demonstrates how applied history 
can work appropriately. Military historians have long studied the battles of the past to 
inform current strategy and tactics. Although, as will be discussed, they are still learning 
how best to accomplish this historical analysis, their approach is helpful to understanding 
how past events can be similarly applied in the disaster domain.  
Unquestionably the first military historian to leverage the past for future value 
was Thucydides. An advocate for keeping to a pure and accurate historical account, he 
also valued the potential of examining war as a means of informing future warriors. In his 
speech entitled, “The Method and Purpose of this History; the Greatest of the 
Peloponnesian War,” Thucydides entreats, “But if he who desires to have before his eyes 
a true picture of the events which have happened, and of the like events which may be 
expected to happen hereafter in the order of human things, shall pronounce what I have 
written to be useful, then I shall be satisfied.”31 This affirmation of the timeless value of 
the historical record underscores the potential value of leveraging what people have 
suffered in the past for the reduction of suffering in the future. Interestingly, Thucydides 
chronicled a plague that attacked Athens during the Peloponnesian War. “The general 
character of the malady no words can describe,” wrote Thucydides, “and the fury with 
which it fastened upon each sufferer was too much for human nature to endure.”32  
Unwittingly, his account could just as well have described Savannah in 1876. 
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Thucydides promoted this approach in the classical era, but it was General Carl 
Von Clausewitz who pioneered applied historical analysis in the modern era of military 
history. Clausewitz stands out as one of the preeminent thinkers of military and national 
strategy. As the senior inspector of artillery for the Prussian army in the early nineteenth 
century, he engaged in a process that would challenge conventional thought on the 
prosecution of war based on a historical context and mental reenactment. In his epic 
tome, On War, Clausewitz demonstrates that approach. In the explanation of the general 
principles of defense, he refers his readers back to previous Prussian engagements, 
namely, the battle of Aspern and the siege of Dantzig.33  
Jon Tetsuro Sumida is a prominent scholar of the implications of On War. In his 
book, Decoding Clausewitz: A New Approach to On War, Sumida unpacks Clausewitz’s 
teachings on the application of history. Sumida writes that Clausewitz “offered 
instruction as to how a sense of intuition, and thus of genius, might be acquired by 
someone without experience in supreme command. This was to be done through the 
mental reenactment of historical case studies of command decision.”34  Thus, Clausewitz 
demonstrates that value of mining the historic record for pragmatic purposes. 
Today, Williamson Murray and Richard Hart Sinnreich echo Clausewitz’s views. 
In their book, The Past as Prologue: The Importance of History to the Military 
Profession, they indict military leadership who “seem to have neither the time nor the 
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inclination to look for the past for help.”35 They cite the example of 2003 Iraq invasion 
planners who, according to the authors, “chose deliberately or by oversight to ignore 
history.”36 Murray and Sinnreich also acknowledge the challenge of applied history as 
previously identified: yielding to oversimplification and improper analysis of the 
historical case. They chide, “The inherent danger, of course, is that one’s own errant 
judgment and prejudices can thus be reinforced, or that one seeks to generalize from the 
particular without taking due account of changing circumstances.” They continue, “This 
points toward the necessity for military professionals to be guided and mentored in their 
study of military history by historians….”37 Their appreciation of both the advantage and 
importance of scholarly reach back should be regarded by disaster professionals. 
The extent to which military historians have applied effort and rigor to the 
exploitation of historical analysis provides an excellent parallel for disaster planners and 
responders. Appropriately reaching back to past disaster events, planners have a unique 
opportunity to avoid similar mistakes. 
The New-Model Monograph of Disaster History 
Currently, the civilian emergency management domain (of which public health is 
an uncomfortable and distant partner), is beleaguered by a reactionary approach. In other 
words, until a problem is detected, no problem exists. This paradigm is problematic and 
deadly, for, by definition, once a problem is detected, it is too late. In the parallel case of 
a flu epidemic, for example, once the flu is deemed epidemic in proportion, incubation 
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and vast spread of the virus has already spawned and has yet to be detected in other 
locations! 
Rosenberg and Sumida advocate for a new military history called “new model 
monograph.”38 They assert that these tools, “employ, and the decision-making process 
analysis approach calls for, the integrated examination of technical, personnel, economic, 
administrative, and financial factors in order to reinterpret the course of policy-making 
and its consequences in operations.”39 Looking at all the ancillary factors of a battle the 
tactical theorist has a much better chance of identifying probable successes and chances 
of failure. This is especially true in modern irregular warfare, where social conditions are 
as much a factor to military success as machinery and weapons. The same can be said for 
the scholarly analysis of a disaster. 
Chapter Conclusion 
Taking the concept of applied history from the military domain to the civilian 
emergency planning domain, the correlation is quite obvious. If the yellow fever outbreak 
in Savannah, Georgia of 1876 was preventable, and specific factors were detectable, 
knowable, and predictable, then, armed with this case history, appropriate surveillance 
can be put in place to monitor those conditions today. Thus, Savannah can be utilized as a 
case study in the training and education of modern community planners and thus 
potentially save lives. 
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This paper, then, seeks to be a framework for the ‘new model monograph’ of a 
potentially new discipline: disaster history. In so doing, the lives of James Cleary, and all 
of those of Savannah who were lost to the terrible curse of yellow fever, can be redeemed 





















CHAPTER TWO: SAVANNAH IN 1876 
 
In 1876, Savannah, Georgia was a prominent and important river port. Savannah 
ranked number three in cotton shipping in the nation.40 Ships would enter the protection 
of the Savannah River from around Tybee Island and deliver goods to the growing city 
while draymen hauled to its banks the cotton and rice that met the requirements of 
foreign markets and the demands of industry. Its importance as a hub of commerce and 
transportation was a driving factor for the city fathers, and the resultant craving for 
shipping would lead the city into economic hardship that would contribute to the disease 
that would kill them.   
On a charter by King George II to form the thirteenth and final colony, James 
Edward Oglethorpe, and 114 colonists sailed from England aboard the Anne in 1733 and 
founded Savannah.  The city was built 16 miles inland from the Atlantic Ocean on the 
banks of the Savannah River and its surrounding Yamacraw Bluff. It was surrounded by 
what is called the lowcountry, which is a stretch of wet, marshy land that runs from 
Charleston, South Carolina, south past Savannah to St. Mary’s, Georgia. Oglethorpe, a 
visionary, determined that Savannah should be built in an orderly and democratic fashion 
and implemented the New World’s first urban planning scheme. Savannah’s streets were 
thus organized around a series of common, grassy squares that characterize the city to 
this day. 
The actual population of Savannah in 1876 is not exactly known. The city’s 
annual report of 1876 lists the population as 18,967, however other numbers have been 
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published. 41 Dr. James J. Waring, prominent political and social figure in Savannah, cites 
the population as 28,000 at the time.42 It is important to note, however, that Dr. Waring 
was a very outspoken opponent to Savannah’s political leaders during the epidemic as 
this paper will highlight. His numbers, and his stated death toll of 2,249, could either 
represent a more accurate assessment (he was also a prominent local physician), or an 
inflated assessment targeted to further embarrass city officials.43 Demographically, the 
city was predominantly colored at 61%, however, the city was controlled, both officially 
and unofficially, by white elites. Either way, Savannah was a small municipality but of 
major economic significance on the Atlantic coast.  
Savannah historically thrived upon cotton, rice and slavery. Although cotton 
reigned as ‘king’ throughout its long history, other cash crops contributed to the 
economy. Significant to the yellow fever scourge was the rice crop that thrived on the 
low wetlands surrounding the river. Efforts in the early 1820s to stimulate the city’s 
economy discovered that elsewhere in the lowcountry, rice plantations were bringing in 
revenue. Several plantations thus emerged, led by plantation owners who were lured to 
Savannah by the promise of new technology, high prices, and promises of Savannah’s 
future prosperity.44 
The rice plantation was the perfect breeding ground for the Aedes aegypti. Jeffery 
R. Young describes the rice plantation as a swampy environment particularly conducive 
to disease. Here, the specific labor demands of rice planting “heightened the slaves’ risk 
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of becoming ill. Standing knee-deep in the periodically flooded fields, lowcountry rice 
slaves were directly exposed to a host of water-born infections.”45Although greatly 
reduced by city-managed dry culture initiatives, the standing water of the rice industry 
left a legacy of drainage problems that would plague the city for years to come. Although 
slavery ended, the plantation system simply replaced slaves with sharecroppers and the 
risks of working in these environments and the public health risks to the general 
population never changed. 
Savannah’s Yellow Fever History 
The epidemic of 1876 was not Savannah’s first visitation by yellow fever. 
Outbreaks in 1820 and 1854 are well documented. In the wake of New Orleans’ epidemic 
in 1853, the outbreak of 1854 was quite worrisome for Savannah residents, and was an 
ominous sign of things to come. Unfortunately, these signs were not recognized in 1876. 
A catastrophic fire ravaged the city in the summer of 1820. The numerous empty 
basement cavities, left behind from burned out buildings, provided ideal conditions for 
the breeding of mosquito larvae.46 The resultant yellow fever outbreak took the lives of 
895 citizens, a full twelve percent of its population. Several interesting issues germinated 
as a result of this first catastrophic outbreak. First, attempts to minimize the extent of the 
outbreak by city officials are first observed. “Mayor Charlton attributed the mortality to 
“fever and ague,” cites author Walter J. Fraser, Jr., and “The City Council published false 
reports that the health of the city was good even as death rates reached epidemic 
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proportions.”47 The mayor recanted his assessment after Savannah residents, who fled to 
other cities for refuge, prompted other Georgia newspapers to challenge the city’s 
statements. This very same practice would re-appear in 1876. 
Another issue that took root during the 1820 outbreak is the emergence of Dr. 
James Proctor Screven as an agitator against city filth and its contribution to the yellow 
fever problem. Following the outbreak of 1820, the city appointed Dr. Screven as the 
city’s health officer to address the city’s sanitation problems. It was this same Screven 
who would later serve as mayor of Savannah from 1856 and 1857 and divert significant 
city funds to cleaning up the city.  
Finally, the 1820 outbreak introduces Dr. James J. Waring to the Savannah yellow 
fever debate. As a member of the elite Waring clan, Waring held tremendous political 
clout. As a local physician, he was very interested in attacking what he felt was the cause 
of the fever: filth and standing water. Both Waring and Screven were instrumental in 
beginning to advocate for a good cleaning of the city. Although it would be much later 
learned that drainage, and not filth per se, was the direct cause of yellow fever spread, the 
city’s awareness of the connection of poor drainage to poor sanitation, can be traced clear 
back to the 1820 epidemic. 
The year 1854 would likewise be a similar year of great tragedy in Savannah. 
Following the script of the 1820 outbreak, city officials minimized the outbreak and 
delayed any official announcement.  Outside newspapers accused Savannah of 
suppressing the outbreak and an open letter would be published in the paper maligning 
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the over-reaction to the illness and calling for calm.48 Mayor Richard Arnold, himself a 
prominent physician, “had joined with politicians, businessmen, and newspaper editors in 
a public relations campaign that was part wishful thinking and part cynical 
manipulation.”49  “Above all else,” continues author Jacqueline Jones, “Savannah’s 
leaders prized prosperity and public order, and on both counts the epidemic was 
devastating.”50Although no figures exist that can attribute death rates to a delay in 
notification, certainly thousands were put at risk and many fell victim to the fever when 
denied the opportunity to flee. The 1854 epidemic would yield similar behaviors and 
similar results, unfortunately warnings were not heeded and history repeated itself, yet 
again, twelve years later. 
Savannah and the Civil War 
Unbelievably, Savannah survived the Civil War virtually unscathed. On the night 
of December 20, 1865, fearing unnecessary destruction to the city, the Mayor, Dr. 
Richard Arnold, and a group of Aldermen, sought out the Union Army to arrange terms 
of the city’s surrender.  On December 21, 1865 General Henry W. Slocum’s Twentieth 
Corps entered the city. The ensuing occupation occurred without violence but the city’s 
occupation by a contingent of 60,000 troops and the sudden influx of freed slaves 
entering into the city’s mainstream was not without difficulties. At the very least, city 
services were stretched to the breaking point until order returned.  
Of note, the city’s black clergy were highly influential in redefining life in 
Savannah after the war, certainly for the freedmen. Perhaps their most dramatic 
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demonstration of their influence was the formation of an all-black school for the ex-slave 
children, immediately after the city’s occupation. Ceremoniously, the children were 
marched out of the First African Baptist Church and into the Bryon Slave Mart on St. 
Julian Street where they sat on benches “surrounded by remnants of the old regime – 
handcuffs, whips, paddles, sales receipts for slaves- and positioned in front of the 
auctioneer’s desk, now occupied by their teacher.”51 It was this and other social 
organizations that would later play an important role when they petitioned the city for 
adequate medical care for the city’s poor. 
After the war Savannah carried on as a cotton hub, but had to learn a new 
behavior under a new social paradigm. Old habits died hard, however, and Savannah 
struggled to redefine itself while shedding that old system. Wishing to exploit its position 
as a cotton-shipping hub, it sought to expand its importance by become a major center of 
commerce and transportation. To accomplish this, the city invested hundreds of 
thousands of taxpayer dollars to own shares in a couple of railroad ventures. As will be 
demonstrated, this move put the city into grave debt. 
Freed blacks continued to suffer under the bondage of old systems.  In July of 
1872, unrest broke out over segregated streetcars. In the end three black protesters lay 
dead and stray bullets wounded “two white women and their children, who were sitting 
on their front stoops on Bull Street”.52 Voting riots also plagued the city, as freedmen 
continued to be harassed at the ballot box. City services remained favorable to white 
elites. Black, and poor white sections, suffered under difficult, if not intolerable, 
conditions. 
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Chapter Conclusion 
On the eve of 1876, Savannah had a rich history of both failure and survival. It 
was, and remains today, the quintessential South, but as August 1876 approached, the 
winds of change were threatening, and the city was perched on the edge of disaster. 
History was prepared to repeat itself as the scorching heat of summer began to stretch 



















CHAPTER THREE: YELLOW FEVER 
 
 Yellow fever was, and still is, a terrible scourge to humans. A viral haemorrhagic 
disease, it still has no known cure. Today, as in 1876, treatment goals are aimed at 
relieving the harsh symptoms that the patient suffers. After incubating in the body for 
three to five days, yellow fever erupts as a fever with two distinct phases. The first phase 
includes severe headache, muscle ache, fever, shivers and loss of appetite, no different 
than most flu-like fevers. After four to five days the symptoms disappear, this remission 
either heralds the end of the attack, or for 15% of the victims, serves as a precursor to a 
more serious, and often deadly second phase. In this acute phase, “high fever 
returns…the patient rapidly develops jaundice and complains of abdominal pain with 
vomiting. Bleeding can occur from the mouth, nose, eyes and stomach.”53 Today, 
approximately 200,000 cases are reported annually worldwide with the death toll at 
approximately 30,000. Much like the nineteenth century, the death rate remains around 
50% of those infected.54 A recent outbreak in Côte d’Ivorie in early 2011 took twenty-
five lives.55 Today, however, a vaccine is available to stop the spread even after an 
outbreaks starts. In the Côte d’Ivorie case, 840,000 people were vaccinated in the 
surrounding region of the outbreak, essentially arresting its proliferation.56 
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Onset of Disease in the New World 
 Yellow fever, or Yellow Jack as it was known in the South, was not a new 
phenomenon in the nineteenth century South. As Europeans started to emerge from their 
continental roots they were both carriers and victims of biological threats. Alfred W. 
Crosby, in his groundbreaking book, Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion 
of Europe, 900-1900, suspects that the first disease of substance crossed the European 
continental border to the British Isles in 664 A.D., evidently “laying low a vast number of 
people.”57  Crosby claims that biological factors were more influential to European 
expansionism than imperial intention. 
 In the New World, disease, including yellow fever, was an early arrival. Smallpox 
and flu obliterated the Huron Indians. From the early to mid seventeenth century this 
tribe dwindled from 30-40,000 down to such a few in number that the remaining remnant 
were simply absorbed into other tribes. A tribe on Nantucket Island, off the coast of 
Massachusetts, was riddled by disease. In 1763, their numbers went from 3,000 down to 
348. “An epidemic of yellow fever that year left only twenty survivors.”58  
Yellow fever, until the last epidemic in 1905, would claim the lives of countless 
native and new Americans. It would appear every summer, throughout the Eastern 
seaboard. Although incorporating all common diseases at the time, scholars estimate that 
the Native American population, in what is now the United States, plummeted from 5-10 
million in 1492, to mere 600,000 in 1800.59 How many whites died is difficult to estimate 
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given the variation of how disease was identified and recorded, however, case-fatality 
rates ranged from 15 to 50% meaning that when yellow fever struck, it struck hard, and 
took a good number of the population with it. Despite its long history, however, yellow 
fever remained an enigma and the warnings of the past often went unheeded. 
 The yellow fever virus is believed to have hit the North American continent in 
Spanish Florida in 1649-1650, but did not extend to the British colonies until 1693 when 
“warships from the West Indies infected Boston and other towns.”60 The theory that it 
came from ships and sailors was widespread and certainly somewhat accurate. The slave 
trade was the culprit. Yellow fever’s origin was in the heart of equatorial Africa. Infected 
slaves, and mosquitos that bred in the various water containers about the ships, survived 
the Middle Passage. White slave-owners, and the various merchants who crowded the 
wharves, provided perfect blood meals for hungry mosquitos to spread their deadly 
poison. As the disease proliferated in the tropics, shipping became the ultimate vehicle by 
which infected persons moved to new locations where the mosquitos took it from there.  
Cities along the coast provided excellent breeding grounds. The congested urban 
environments were exactly what the mosquitos needed. Gerald N. Grob explains: 
“Irrigation practices, for example, created stagnant bodies of water, thereby providing 
better conditions for… mosquitos serving as vectors for malaria and yellow fever.”61 
Ironically, the Savannah Morning News declared on the day after James Cleary’s death, 
on August 22, 1876, “If some of our inventive geniuses will only introduce something 
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that will cause mosquitoes to sleep at night his fortune will be made.”62 This innocent 
side note in the morning paper was an omen of things to come. 
 Those people who originated within the African continent, and who had been 
exposed, either directly or genetically, to yellow fever carried a level of immunity to the 
disease. Although they would contract it, they seemed to have better survival rates. This 
immunity actually helped justify the importation of black slaves who were more 
acclimated to disease and thus more suitable for labor in the sub-tropical south. Dubbed 
the ‘stranger’s disease’ by most, it was apparent that those who came to the American 
South from cooler climates were most likely to die from yellow fever. During the 
epidemic of 1820 in Savannah, eighty percent of the deaths were outsiders, or ‘strangers,’ 
who became “transient fodder for the saffron scourge.”63 
Climate and Yellow fever 
 Certain climates were very favorable for the spread of the yellow fever virus. The 
Aedes aegypti mosquito is active in moist, hot conditions, and thus the American South 
was ideal. The mosquito tended to breed in the common sights of the nineteenth century 
urban environment. Small vessels of water, such as flowerpots, rain gutters, storm 
sewers, water storage barrels, and the brackish water of non-flowing canals were all 
perfect places for mosquitos to breed. For the residents of the South, the ‘sickly season’ 
came like clockwork as the spring storms left their watery breeding grounds and the 
scorching hot and humid summers kept them intact long enough for the larvae to emerge. 
The heat was needed for the mosquito to feed, and feed she did. It is difficult to ascertain 
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whether it was simple complacency that lulled Savannah, and other communities, into a 
sense of inevitability, or whether sheer ignorance was at play. Regardless, the climate 
calendar alone should have caused the red flags to be raised as the tragedy quietly 
approached. 
Other Diseases of the South 
 Yellow fever was not the only disease that troubled the Southerner. Malaria, 
cholera, chronic diarrhea, typhoid fever, and smallpox were also bad characters. 
Understanding these maladies helps to understand how sanitation was critical to general 
disease prevention as a whole and how the understanding of malaria, at the time, would 
minimize the confusion of ‘mistakenly’ identifying James Cleary’s cause of death as 
congestive fever. 
 Malaria, unlike yellow fever, is a parasite that is transmitted by another breed of 
mosquito: the Anopheles. Like the Aedes Aegypti, the Anopheles breeds in stagnant pools 
and requires blood meals to ovulate and thus reproduce. Thus malaria was a prevalent, 
but less fearsome, companion to southern life and mortality. Plasmodium falciparum, the 
most virulent form of malaria, was known as congestive fever in the nineteenth century, 
clearly identifying it as a strain of malaria. Thus, The Savannah Morning News’ reporting 
of the burial of James Cleary as due to congestive fever, following an autopsy, was a 
clear misrepresentation, either by the newspaper, or by the person who reported the death 
to the paper. The interest, by many parties within Savannah, to suppress any panic 
reaction by the citizens was certainly in play, and citing ‘congestive fever’ as a cause of 
death was a convenient way to avoid the flight to the countryside that slowed paper sales. 
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 Conditions that caused malaria were widely known and help explain how the 
conditions leading up to 1876 were unmistakably dangerous. Andrew McIlwain Bell 
relates that, “Residents of lower Louisiana and Mississippi who lived in swamps near the 
Mississippi River routinely evacuate their homes to escape the strange sickness that 
mysteriously appeared whenever it flooded.”64 The American Quaker poet and 
abolitionist, John Greenleaf Whittier, in his poem “The Farewell” also reveals life in the 
dangerous environment of the South. He laments, 
 Gone, gone, sold and gone 
 To the rice swamp dark and lone 
 Where the slave-whip ceaseless swings, 
 Where the noisome insect stings, 
 Where the fever-demon strews 
 Poison with the falling dews, 
 Where the sickly sunbeams glare 
 Through the hot misty air.65 
 
Thus, Whittier captured the essence of the southern disease threat: water (rice swamp), 
mosquitos (insect stings), and summer’s heat (sickly sunbeams). This poem is evidence 
that the components of yellow fever were known even if they were not fully understood. 
 Cholera was another endemic disease of the South. Unlike yellow fever, a virus, 
or malaria, a parasite, cholera is caused when the victim ingests contaminated water or 
food. The resultant infection within the small intestine causes extreme, watery diarrhea 
and vomiting that dehydrates the victim, often to death.  In the nineteenth century, 
cholera was known to have a link to poor sanitation. Dr. John Woodworth, America’s 
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first U.S. Surgeon General, was keen on cholera’s threat. As Surgeon General of the 
Union Army during the Civil War, he saw cholera’s devastating effects and was a 
champion for its elimination. In his review of a report published in the Indian Annuls of 
Medical Science in 1876 entitled, “The Cholera Epidemic of 1873 in the United States of 
America,” Woodworth indicts the Indian findings on cholera as inaccurate and not 
scientifically based. He also states that, “The only lessons taught by Indian experience as 
to the best mode of dealing with cholera are, that a good sanitary condition affords the 
best chance of escape.…”66 Thus even cholera was identified as a sanitation issue. 
Interestingly, Woodworth would play a role in the Quarantine Act of 1878 following the 
yellow fever outbreak of the Mississippi basin in 1878. 
 There were few diseases in the nineteenth century that were not understood, or 
suspected, of being caused or worsened by poor sanitation. Although the mosquito was 
not identified as the vector, it was considered part of the broad public health problem. 
Likewise, poor drainage was always included as a component of the sanitation problem. 
As 1876 loomed, Savannah knew the diseases, knew the problem, and could have only 
anticipated tragedy. 
Yellow Fever and the Civil War 
The Civil War was characterized by more than bloody military campaigns. Fifty 
percent of all causalities, from both sides, were due to disease. This is a significant figure 
given the volume of literature that focuses on the war’s bloody battles and valiant 
generals. The truth is, half of all the soldiers who died didn’t die in a pool of blood on the 
battlefield, but rather in a pool of vomit or feces in a fetid field hospital or along the 
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marching trail. The importance of the war’s disease problem is key to understanding 
Savannah’s culpability in the 1876 tragedy. As disease began to have a negative impact 
on battlefield success or failure, military medicine increased its efforts to face this new 
enemy. As a result, preventative measures were well known throughout the theatre of war 
and these measures were well published and institutionalized throughout both armies.  
As early as 1862, in the war’s infancy, yellow fever was identified as a threat to 
Union troops and measures were taken to reduce it. On May 1, 15,000 troops, under the 
command of Major General Benjamin F. Butler, landed at New Orleans to occupy the 
captured city. Although the Union Navy, under David Farragut, had overcome the city’s 
military defenses, the Confederacy was hoping that yellow jack would take on and defeat 
the Union’s ground troops. Children chanted taunts to their invaders and called upon 
yellow fever to intervene. Butler, also fearful of yellow fever’s threat to his troops, 
immediately took measures to clean up the city. Bell tells this story in his book, Mosquito 
Soldiers: Malaria, Yellow Fever, and the Course of the Civil War. Bell describes Butler’s 
measures: 
In town Butler put an army of laborers to work around the clock flushing gutters, 
sweeping debris, and inspecting sites thought to be unclean such as stables, 
‘butcheries,’ and New Orleans many ‘haunts of vice and debauchery.’ Steam-
powered pumps siphoned stagnant water from basins and canals into nearby 
bayous.67 
 
These measures were a huge success. During the summer of 1862 in New 
Orleans, only two deaths were attributed to yellow fever. Bell goes on to confirm, “His 
[Butler’s] stringent sanitation policy eliminated many of the places where Aedes aegypti 
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mosquitos preferred to breed, such as rain-filled receptacles and stagnant pools.”68 It is 
important to note that the drainage of standing water was, again, believed to be a 
component of community cleanliness, thus the war provided valuable insight into 
community preparedness. Bell goes on to say that newspapers picked up on this success, 
thus the news of these sanitation measures, and their outcomes, were widely known 
beyond New Orleans. Although it is likely that Butler’s specific actions were forgotten by 
the time 1876 rolled around, there would have certainly been a continued general 
consciousness of the positive affects of improved sanitation that would have existed. 
The Yellow Fever Debate 
 There were two major theories regarding the cause and spread of yellow fever 
during the period. Among physicians, the lines of debate were drawn on medicine. 
Politically, the debate was drawn along local and national political policy lines. In 
Savannah, the debate was quite animated, especially among local doctors. 
 As a matter of context, it is important to understand that public health, as a formal 
and sustaining component of community administration, was in its infancy in 1876. As 
discussed in the example of the 1854 outbreak, public health officers or sanitation 
committees were formed in reaction to unusual circumstances. Following the New 
Orleans epidemic of 1853, the Louisiana legislature established the Louisiana Board of 
Health, but its effectiveness was marginalized by political battles over quarantine and 
poor funding.69 Other factors hampered public health initiatives. John H. Ellis, in his 
work, Yellow Fever and Public Health in the New South makes a damning observation. 
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He asserts, “Within the context of southern slaveholding society, a society ruled by the 
paternal authority of a slaveholding class, assertion of liberal, urban bourgeois values, 
such as sanitary reform, were anathema to the governing ideology.”70  
Georgia would have its own experience with a public health initiative. The 
Georgia State Legislature did not form a permanent State Board of Health until 1903, or 
did it? Georgia had, in fact, formed a board in 1875 but “halted all work in 1877.”71 Ellis 
goes on to say that, “The new agency was opposed from the beginning, however, by 
county politicians; by sectarian medical practitioners, who opposed the law’s 
discrimination in favor of regular physicians; and by the municipal authorities of 
Brunswick and Savannah, who resented the board’s investigative activity during the 
yellow fever epidemics in 1876.”72 This failure of public health initiatives is due to the 
hesitancy of local governments to recognize the interference of higher government in 
local affairs.  
 The debate over the cause and spread of yellow fever was divided into two camps: 
local origin and importation. Each camp had an almost religious conviction of its view 
despite the fact that little, if any, hard science could back up their claims. In Savannah, 
this debate would rage for years. 
 The local origin theory, or non-contagion theory, held that yellow fever was not 
contagious and that pervasive local conditions caused it. The medical community, who 
was most cognizant of early studies, and perhaps observed local conditions in a more 
objective manner, largely held to this theory. Local origin was partly supported by the 
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findings of early researchers, including Benjamin Rush, who, in the late eighteenth 
century, declared that the disease non-contagious and nothing more than “aggravated 
form of the autumnal fevers” not uncommon to Philadelphia.73 Rush, an ardent 
revolutionary and signatory of the American Declaration of Independence, was also a 
physician, receiving his medical training at the University of Edinburgh. Having 
established a medical practice in Philadelphia, he was on hand during the yellow fever 
outbreak in that city in 1778.  
 These pervasive local conditions included a host of sanitation problems that were 
problematic throughout the nation’s fledgling urban regions, namely sewage, privies, 
poor water drainage, and rotting flesh and vegetation. As population densities increased, 
so did these conditions, and as cities grew, so did the problem. This invisible poison was 
called miasma and it emanated from the rotting flesh of dead animals, dead foliage or the 
stench of stagnant pools. Falligant, a local origin theorist, describes these factors: 
I feel more inclined to believe that that the exhalations of the wet-cultured rice-
field in the period of the harvest-flow become more deadly, not so much from 
vegetation as from organic or insectivorous decomposition, superinduced in these 
stagnant waters by the hot summer suns.  
What wonder, then, that our atmosphere became infiltrated with poisonous 
emanate! And when we add to this the special pestilential element infused from 
the ammonioco-putrid odors of the open-surfaced Bilbo sewer outlet… the foul 
gases everywhere exuding from unflushed sewers, privies and dry-wells, and the 
filthy street washings.…74 
  
The publication entitled, History of the pestilence, commonly called yellow fever, 
which almost devastated Philadelphia, in the months of August, September and October, 
1798, demonstrates the eerie similarities between Savannah and the earlier Philadelphia 
epidemics. Hot, humid weather, poor sanitation, and bugs pervaded the city. Again, as in 
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Savannah’s case, poor drainage is not directly associated with yellow fever, but is 
considered as a part of the sanitation problem. Describing Philadelphia, the book states, 
“A few years ago, there were numbers of ponds of stagnant water, in the outlots of the 
city, that periodically subjected the inhabitants surrounding them to fever-and-ague.”75 
Also mentioned was that, “Many tribes of insects were uncommonly numerous; as 
mosquitoes, ants, crickets, cockroaches, & c [sic].”76 Local origin theorists also 
recognized that the disease tended to remain confined to a particular locality rather than 
spreading to a region. When an outbreak erupted, residents fled to the country but seldom 
did any yellow fever follow the evacuees.77 
The importation theory, also known as the contagion theory, held that skin 
contact, clothes contact, or even breathing the same air as an infected person spread 
yellow fever person-to-person. This theory was favored by the press and the general 
public and allowed the public to seek a scapegoat and look externally for the cause and 
the ultimate blame.  
Typically, officials would identify a particular ship that arrived in port with sick 
sailors, establish that the sick sailors had shore contact with uninfected persons, and thus 
spread the disease. Dr. Octavius White reported that Cleary lived “within a stone’s-throw 
of the river bank, about eight hundred and fifty feet from the habitual haunt of all [sic.] 
Spanish seamen who frequented the port, and even within the identical street, about two 
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blocks distant.”78 In the case of the 1854 epidemic in Savannah, for instance, the slave 
ship Raminez was believed to be the culprit.79 
The difficulty with this position was political. Although it was easy, and often 
beneficial, to blame a foreign villain, the answer for the contagion theory was quarantine, 
and quarantine spelled economic hardship. Quarantine required that all incoming 
shipping be stopped at anchorage, boarded, and inspected for any signs of illness or 
disease. The ship would be held for “sufficient time to cover the period of incubation of 
the disease,” typically no less than five days.80 If no illness emerged, the ship would be 
allowed to proceed to port. If illness was found, the ship was doomed to anchorage, 
boarded daily by a city-paid medical doctor, until such a time that the sick either died or 
recovered, often lasting weeks. 
In order to perform proper quarantine, a quarantine station had to be constructed 
on an outer island where quarantined ships could be supported with food and water, and 
where sick seamen could be isolated from the rest of the crew. The logistical support of 
the ships, the daily costs of medical care, and the construction and maintenance of 
quarantine stations were expensive and had no source of financial sustainment.81 
Likewise, the disinfection process, including purging a ship with sulpher dioxide, steam, 
and formaldehyde gas was labor intensive and complicated.82 More importantly, the 
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interruption of commerce was serious causing delays in the arrival of important goods, 
the spoiling of fragile cargoes, and the back up of cotton bales. Le Hardy lamented, 
“While then this policy of strict quarantine has been barren of good results in keeping 
yellow fever out of the country, what has been the effects upon our commerce? Look at 
the seaports: Savannah, the greatest of them, with an export business of $100,000,000 a 
year, has scarcely any imports – has no great warehouses from which to supply the 
people at her very doors.”83 This political contradiction could not be solved.  
Regardless of the cause, or conditions of spread, both theories agreed on one 
thing: poor sanitation and standing water was a contributing factor to yellow fever. 
Sanitation became of prominent theme throughout the South. The perception that the 
South was unhealthy threatened to hurt commerce and its re-emergence following the war 
and reconstruction. The South collectively tried to change that image by improving 
conditions and by suppressing yellow fever outbreaks.  
Nineteenth-Century Medicine 
Medicine in 1876 Savannah reflected medicine throughout the South and included 
a mixture of modern and archaic approaches. Although some of the treatments for yellow 
fever, during the period, may seem on the surface to be primitive, they were honest 
attempts at overcoming the disease and to reduce mortality. The almost mystical 
character of yellow fever contributed to the medical profession’s awkward attempts at 
treatment. 
Medical practice, and its practitioners, consisted of a blend of competency and 
ineptitude. The horrors of the war brought about certain advances in the treatment of 
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wounds, and in some cases disease, but still medicine had yet to reach a standard of 
practice. Bell states, “Medicine in the 1860s was a hodgepodge of ancient shibboleths, 
folk remedies, and sound scientific practices. As inheritors of the Greek tradition, Civil 
War-era physicians viewed the body as a precariously balanced concoction of chemicals 
which any number of external and environmental stimuli could alter.”84 It was these 
stimuli that drew the attention of the local origin theorists who blamed the poison miasma 
as the culprit to the disease.  
In 1876, physicians were still a mix of self-proclaimed and duly educated 
practitioners. Medical schools remained predominantly commercial enterprises and fell 
outside of mainstream academia. Once through school, a budding doctor would 
apprentice himself with a practicing physician who may, or may not, be a duly educated 
practitioner. No standards existed for what an apprenticeship required or what constituted 
successful completion.  
The physicians in Savannah seemed to be organized and well connected. The 
Georgia Medical Society chapter in Savannah was well established and apparently had 
sufficient influence to order the rest of one of its physicians, Dr. Cornelius Rea Agnew, 
during the epidemic. In a letter to his personal physician on September 13, 1876, Agnew 
wrote, “I was completely broken down and ordered to rest by our Medical Society. I 
stayed outside of the city.”85 The Society also provided rudimentary care to the poor. 
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Under agreement with the city, the Society established a rotation of local doctors who 
would pay visits to the sickly poor.86 
Treating Yellow fever 
Treatment for yellow fever ranged from the ridiculous to the sublime. Dr. 
Falligant outlines several medicinal treatments: 
The milder types [of yellow fever cases] have already been sufficiently prescribed 
to render separate illustration unnecessary, except to add that they readily yielded 
to Aconite and Belladonna tinctures, in watery solution of five drops to a tumbler 
of water, given in table-spoonful doses in hourly alternation, warm mustard foot-
baths being additionally employed to facilitate transportation. In some cases, 
Aresu., Ipecac., Merc [mercury], sol., China, Nux vomica, Khus tox., and Sulfer 
were found useful in reliving associated derangements.87 
 
Even less sophisticated remedies prospered. Sniffing rags dipped in vinegar, burning 
gunpowder, and even the practice of women smoking cigars were all believed to have 
therapeutic value. Many of these treatments were unchanged since the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries.88 
It was Quinine that seemed to have the most universal use and benefit. Discovered 
effective during the war, it was the availability of this medicine that would determine the 
health, and thus battle readiness, of both Union and Confederate troops. In Savannah, Dr. 
Falligant used Quinine during the remission period between the two phases, claiming “it 
possesses the happy faculty of cutting off further progress of the disease in a large 
proportion of cases.”89 
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Chapter Conclusion 
 Yellow fever, as was other disease, pervasive in Southern life. Other diseases 
were more prevalent than yellow fever, however the horrible manner by which its victims 
succumbed caused yellow fever to become the predominant cause of public health 
concerns. Grob writes, “One of the most striking characteristics of these outbreaks was 
the visibility of the dead. Many communities were unable to bury victims quickly 
enough, and the presence of cadavers, particularly in the warmer months, sometimes 
constituted a serious health problem.”90 Constant exposure to a disease, as virulent and 
deadly as yellow fever, demanded a definitive response. The conditions that enabled the 
fevers were well known and public, and Savannah, had it been monitoring these various 
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CHAPTER FOUR: PHYSICAL CONDITIONS IN SAVANNAH 
 
 Savannah, Georgia was a Petri dish for yellow fever. Its physical characteristics 
provided the perfect breeding ground for yellow fever’s vector: the Andes aegypti 
mosquito. At this point, however, the mosquito will be removed from the discussion, as it 
was unknown at the time that the mosquito was the underlying problem. What was 
known, and well known, was that poor sanitary conditions contributed to the origination, 
spread, and virility of yellow fever. This being known, city officials had but to open their 
eyes during the summer of 1876 and realize that Savannah was on the brink of disaster. 
Physical conditions within the city, both naturally present and brought upon it, were 
perfectly suited for the disease to take root and spread. The opportunity to prevent the 
outbreak, however, was lost as officials deferred to other agendas and allowed the 
conditions to persist. 
Naturally Found Physical Characteristics 
 Climate and topography were natural characteristics that set Savannah up for a 
constant battle against disease. Both the general public and city officials commonly 
recognized these two natural conditions. They knew that the city was predisposed to 
outbreak and that a constant vigilance was warranted. 
 Located in the subtropics, the climate of Savannah is easy to define. Winters are 
mild, but frosts are expected and typically will kill any lingering insect populations. 
Spring and early summer bring rains, followed by intensely hot and humid summers that 
last well into late October and early November. The ‘sickly season’ was known to begin 
 47 
in late June and last until late October. As mid-August, 1876 approached, this climactic 
pattern was to be observed and documented. 
 In 1877, Dr. Alfred Woodhull of Savannah recalled, “The evidence as to the 
special local conditions affecting the city in 1876 is conflicting, but may be summed up 
as follows: The winter of 1875-6 was very mild, less rain fell during the spring than 
usual; a great access of rain fell in June, and there was a great complaint of the 
extraordinary degree and duration of the heat.”91 Savannah resident and diarist Solomon 
Gleason confirmed this weather pattern. He wrote on June 14, “Raining 6¼ inches again 
in 3 days. Today rain fell 4⅛ inches.”92 Gleason also commented on the extreme heat 
from June 24 through the 30.93 Thus early spring provided the slurry that would soon 
breed the fetid odors, or miasma, that would be blamed for the yellow fever’s arrival. 
 The penetrating heat of August would provide the catalyst to turn the wet slurry 
into the poison thought to be the fever’s genesis. Gleason, a tireless recorder of daily 
temperatures (he even recorded the temperature while lamenting the eight month 
anniversary of his wife’s death), documented the extreme heat that was present the entire 
month of July and well into August. On the eve of the epidemic, August 19, he wrote, 
“This is the hottest day I have every experienced. 102° in my office and sticky. Sultry as 
possible.”94  Speaking of the 1876 epidemic at a meeting of the New York Academy of 
Medicine on December 21, 1876, Dr. Octavius White of Savannah said, “It is generally 
conceded that the form of yellow-fever epidemic is determined by electricity, heat, 
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humidity, and by prevailing winds, and its character intensified by pernicious gases 
which exhale from paludal sources, unsanitary sewers, privy-vaults, stables, vaceries, and 
middens.”95  It was not only the physicians who recognized the significance of the sickly 
season, however. 
 There is evidence that the general populace was well aware of various climactic 
conditions that affected yellow fever. This evidence indicates that Savannah’s 
businessmen followed a practice intended to thwart disease. As the close of the business 
day neared, they would leave the city and spend the night in towns located around the 
city. This nightly sojourn was done in order to avoid the poisons in the air believed to be 
partly carried by evening breezes in the city.96 
On December 2, 1876, Eleanor Lytle Kinzie (Nelly) Gordon, prominent Savannah 
resident, writes in a letter addressed to “Daisy”, perhaps one of her daughters, “Papa is 
getting well now, though I feared that he was going to be ill after Mr. Tison’s death. The 
type of yellow fever he had, was so malignant that the doctors [thought] there should be 
no public funeral… There has been ice here & a black frost, so we are in no more danger 
of even sporadic cases.”97 Culturally, the public understood the climactic markers of the 
season, everybody knew about the sickly season and what it meant. 
Although Savannah suffered through hot summers every year, 1876 was 
noticeably unique. It rained harder than usual during the early summer and the summer’s 
heat was unusually intense. The fact that these conditions were documented is evidence 
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that it was noticed and should have been warning, even as early as July, that the coming 
sickly season was bound to be worse that usual. 
The topography of Savannah also made it a target of disease. Dr. Woodhull 
describes it well in his paper, On the Causes of the Epidemic of Yellow Fever at 
Savannah, Georgia, in 1876: 
Savannah lies on a sandy plain…the plain, which is about a mile and a half wide, 
gradually slopes toward the swamps on the south, and suddenly falls away to 
lowlands, which have an average of five (5) feet above low water on the east and 
west. North of the city, across the main channel of the river and two hundred 
(200) yards distant, is Hutchinson’s island, equally low, or lower, and swampy. 
The territory… is now owned or controlled by the city, and that on the west is 
known collectively as the Springfield plantation. This low belt, which can be 
restrained from lapsing into its natural condition of swamps only by constant 
care… [is] of irregular shape and indefinite extent in other directions. Only those 
lands that immediately adjoin the city are under any provision of dry culture or 
drainage… beyond them, in nearly every direction, are undrained lands and 
swamps.98 
 
Woodhull identifies two major factors of the terrain. First, Savannah, at least the areas 
closest to the river and surrounding waterways, is swamp. Second, constant surveillance  
was required to prevent lands claimed for other uses from returning to swamp. This 
problem of drainage plagued the city and was considered a key component to the sanitary 
health of the city. 
 Noah Webster, the prolific educator and political pundit, understood the overall 
importance of sanitation and drainage to the yellow fever problem. In a series of letters to 
Dr. William Curie, in 1779, regarding the topic of yellow fever, this ardent local origin 
theorist wrote, “No city should be raised on level earth.”99 He would go on to write, “But 
the fact… is very important; and demonstrates the principles I have advanced, with 
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respect to the salubrity of a dry hilly country, and the insalubrity of a low, flat, marshy 
country.”100 Webster’s investigation into yellow fever was extensive and his findings 
claimed that sanitation and healthy air were critical to the prevention of yellow fever and 
its spread. Writings of the renowned Dr. Roque José de Oyarvide Y Samaritin of Cuba 
during the late eighteenth century concur with Webster. He simply stated, “damp and 
marshy places should be filled in.”101 
 Drainage was a recognized nuisance by both the city and the general citizenry. In 
1873, a citation was issued to a Mr. Swoll who had erected a dam on his property.  The 
Health and Cemetery and Dry Culture Committees heard the case and reported that, “Mr. 
Swoll be requested to abate the nuisance at the rear of the Arkwright Cotton Factory, 
consisting of a dam which ponds water thus destroying the natural flow of the water.”102  
The Springfield plantation was a constant source of debate. This property, that 
was once a rice planation, was purchased by the city in order to control the drainage 
problem. A series of dams and dikes were constructed and water was let in and let out 
based on various factors that are not completely understood today. It was this plantation 
that would become the political and literal battleground between the importation and 
local origin theories and the unwillingness of the city to remove known wet areas. 
Ultimately this battle would culminate in a dramatic scene. The importance in mentioning 
this drama here is to highlight the fact that drainage was widely recognized as an 
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influential factor in yellow fever and was identified as a problem in Savannah before the 
outbreak would emerge. 
 It was the night of October 25, 1876 when Dr. James Waring quietly entered the 
Springfield plantation. The epidemic was now waning yet tensions were high as the 
medical community and city officials debated over blame for the epidemic. Waring, an 
outspoken proponent of the local origin theory, was determined to solve the drainage 
problem that he so adamantly accused the city of ignoring. Evidence shows that Waring 
was involved in the Springfield Plantation situation, and other drainage problems, prior to 
his actions in October. He had even informed the Committee on Poudrette of his work to 
eliminate the drainage problems.103 In a September 30, 1876 letter to the committee he 
writes that the “Springfield is drained and that I have found the outlet to the brick ponds 
on Thunderbolt Road and that they will be dry and covered with lime.”104 Due to 
insufficient maintenance, even during the epidemic, the Springfield plantation land 
apparently remained full of stagnant water. Dr. Waring decided to take the law into his 
own hands. 
 Dr. Waring succeeded in his plan but not without ultimately being arrested and 
charged on three counts. First, “by cutting, or causing to be cut… a dam erected on said 
Springfield Plantation… and obstructed and interfered with established system of 
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drainage….”105 Second, “by digging, or causing to be dug… a ditch in West Broadway 
Street without the permission of Council….”106 Third, “by causing a connection to be 
made with the ‘Hogg Sewer’, draining certain portions of the low lands west of the City 
of Savannah and certain drains in said western portion of said City and deflecting the 
water and drainage from the Screven Sewer without permission of Council.”107 This case, 
although insignificant in the larger picture of the epidemic, illustrates the extent to which 
there was a general consciousness of drainage problems by both the city and medical 
community.  The veracity of Waring’s bold action indicates that the city had a drainage 
problem, that the drainage problem was known to be implicated in yellow fever 
outbreaks, and that they chose not to solve the drainage problem in advance of the sickly 
season. 
Man-Made Physical Characteristics 
 Savannah also suffered from several man-made physical conditions that 
contributed to the yellow fever problem. Much like its climate and the natural topography 
of the land, these structures caused drainage problems that worsened sanitation conditions 
and thus released the suspected poisonous gasses.  
Drainage and sanitation conditions were a general nuisance. A report to the Board 
of Health of the City of Savannah, by the Committee on Poudrette in 1866, indicates the 
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general sanitation conditions of the city.108 The committee, chaired by none other than 
Dr. James Waring, indicts the city’s handling of sanitation issues. It cites: 
It is the opinion of our committee that, on the subject of their special 
investigation, this city is peculiarly criminal. We venture the opinion that there is 
not a town or city in this broad Union so wretchedly provided with the means of 
removing from sight, smell, and atmospheric contaminations, the offensive animal 
matters that unavoidably accumulate….109 
 
Although no specific documents could be located, this same report identified two 
committees that were to report to the Board of Health: The Committee of Five on 
Poudrette and the Committee of Ten on Drainage and Sewerage. This evidence reinforces 
the fact that drainage, going back to 1866, was identified as an important component of 
the city’s public health. 
 The greatest artificial drainage problem in the city was the notorious Bilbo Canal. 
Named after the old rice plantation whose land it crossed, it was built to drain the city’s 
eastern dry culture lands. Various sewer lines along its one and one third mile course 
poured into the canal to eventually be emptied into the river. Floodgates located along its 
course were to be opened with the incoming tide allowing fresh water to enter into the 
canal, and naturally flush it of its contents as the tides receded. It was known to be source 
of foul odors as fecal matter became snagged in the canals various irregularities. The 
canal was poorly maintained and the floodgates not opened on a regular basis. Dr. 
Woodhull reports on the Bilbo Canal’s condition leading up to the epidemic. He states, 
“The city surveyor thinks the exact number of times it was flushed before the epidemic 
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was six.”110 Falligant claimed that he was “officially informed [that the Bilbo Canal] had 
not been flooded with fresh water from the river for eight or ten months prior to the 
breaking out of the epidemic.”111 
 In 1875, the city embarked on extensive sewer and drainage projects. The 
Mayor’s annual report cites numerous expansions including, the building of “two large 
trunks… for the purpose of preventing the flow of tide water up the creek and canal, by 
which the drainage from the swamp would be impeded.”112 Even the Bilbo Canal is 
mentioned. “This canal,” the report boasts, “has received constant attention during the 
year. The obstructions, which are continually forming from the sand and refuse matter of 
the sewers, have been removed, and tide water admitted as often as was deemed 
necessary for purification.”113 This simple report establishes two things. First, it 
establishes that the city did, indeed, have sewer and drainage problems, and one of them, 
the Bilbo Canal, was particularly problematic. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the 
report establishes the extent of the degradation of care and maintenance to sewer and 
drainage that occurred in 1876. 
 Dr. W. Duncan, a period physician, embarked on a quantitative analysis of deaths 
in Savannah between 1854 and 1869. His work, entitled, Tabulated Mortuary Record of 
the City of Savannah, From January 1, 1854 to December 31, 1869, was studied by Anne 
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and Everett Lee. Explaining the decrease in white deaths during this fifteen-year period, 
the authors quote Duncan who claimed,  
There can be no doubt that a more thorough observance of Hygienic rules, as 
developed from time to time, affords some solution to the inquiry. Foremost 
amongst these may be mentioned a more effectual system of drainage, a 
scrupulous regard to the cleanliness and police of the city, and the removal of all 
offensive, decaying, and deleterious matter from within its limits.114 
 
Published in 1870, Duncan’s work quantitatively established the health benefits of 
improved drainage and sanitation before the 1876 timeframe. A damning report for a city 
that was reducing its drainage maintenance while the problem was growing.115 
Chapter Conclusion 
Between the sheer topography of the city and the inattention to the sewerage and 
drainage systems, Savannah was a cesspool. The spring rains filled every possible cavity 
and these standing pools of water around the houses, and the drainage systems of the city, 
were breeding mosquitos. The extreme heat of summer would compel those mosquitoes 
to seek blood meals, and the result of these feeding orgies would spread yellow fever 
from one sick person to another. 
 As the sickly season of 1876 loomed upon the city, the physical conditions were 
ripe for disaster. Although it was certainly not cheap to maintain these systems, the city 
simply neglected to reduce the physical hazards that were well known to them. 116 In the 
aftermath of the epidemic, a letter from the Chatham County Grand Jury to the Georgia 
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Medical Society indicates the tenor of the charges being levied against the city. The 
letter, dated December 15, 1876, states,  
The Grand Jury having appointed a Committee to confer with your honorable 
body, relative to the causes producing the late epidemic, and to the existence of 
small pox in our midst; this Committee respectfully request that you will furnish 
them with such information, and such advice, as you may deem necessary, and 
that which the Grand Jury can act, and especially do we desire your opinion upon 
the condition of the city sewers, and the length of time each day that water should 
be turned into said sewers be means of the faucets in the cesspools.117 
 
Undoubtedly, the Grand Jury received a great deal of information and opinion. 
 Although the physical conditions in the city were clearly the direct cause of the 
epidemic, other conditions existed that contributed to the city’s liability. These political 
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CHAPTER FIVE: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN SAVANNAH 
 
 Political conditions contributed to the condition of drainage and sanitation in the 
city. These conditions included the poor economic health of the city, politics of yellow 
fever’s cause and spread, suppression of yellow fever outbreaks, compliance with local, 
state, and Federal regulations, and conservative foreign policy. Each of these political 
factors clouded policy decisions as it related to city cleanliness. Although it is arguable 
whether or not any or all of these conditions were avoidable, it is not arguable that they 
contributed to the general poor health of the city and susceptibility to yellow fever. 
Economic Conditions 
 The economic conditions of the city in 1876 were an indicator of the political 
context. Simply stated, Savannah was broke, and decisions made in city hall reflected this 
fact. Perhaps this was inevitable. Faced with extensive debt and the resultant budget 
implications, difficult decisions had to be made. Defenses designed to resist an unseen 
virus were to be targeted for reductions. 
 The city was deep in debt. Like most Southern cities, it was seeking desperately to 
reinvent itself in the post-reconstruction period. The South as a whole had been 
stereotyped as a place of sickness and death. Northern sentiment surely reflected this fact. 
Describing some northern utopians’ fear of settling in the Southern environment, 
Brundage states, “During the early nineteenth century, the South had been identified with 
deadly disease, hazardous miasmas, and paralyzing heat. In the northern eyes, the 
 58 
southern landscape became inseparable from both physical and moral decay.”118 For 
Savannah, improving its image meant improving the city’s aesthetic appeal in order to 
attract business visitors.  
Paradoxically, cleanliness was partly to blame for the city’s filth. Mayor John 
Screven was the champion of city-sponsored sanitation initiatives. During his 
administration, from 1869 through 1873, significant money was spent to clean the city 
up. Sewer and drainage projects prospered. The dry culture system, an initiative to reduce 
the amount of wetlands around the city, was well funded and successful. But even this 
successful initiative had its cost. “City government paid planters forty dollars an acre to 
grow within a one-mile radius of Savannah only those crops that required dry-culture. 
The government financed this plan by floating a bond issue for two-thirds of the 
$200,000 required to implement dry culture.”119  
Pressure to build into the city’s transportation infrastructure also caused 
considerable expenditures.  In 1866 the city purchased a dredge in order to maintain and 
even expand the river port. The initial outlay, of $72,000, and the high costs of 
maintaining such machinery contributed to the city’s financial woes. The dredge did 
improve river commerce. Figures indicate that inbound tonnage increased from 168,748 
tons in 1865 to over a million in 1869, however, the high cost of maintenance further 
intensified budget woes. By 1869, the cost of operating the dredge reached the $125,000 
mark.120   
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Investments in both the Central Railroad and the Atlantic & Gulf Railroad, 
although a success on the surface, brought few returns. The push to connect Savannah 
with the larger market backfired. Savannah’s relative significance diminished and 
“unfortunately, Savannah was no longer the stopping point of preference” for 
commerce.121  To accomplish the purchase of these owning shares, the city floated 
additional bonds. The end result of these debts, and the financial challenges of the 
epidemic, would result in financial failure. On February 2, 1877, Dr. Waring, himself 
now a city alderman, presented a resolution that would declare the city bankrupt. The 
resolution did not pass, but the financial crisis continued. The Atlantic & Gulf Railroad 
went belly up, forcing the city to pay $300,000 of bonds. Furthermore, the $4,000,000 of 
debt the city owed represented a full one half of all the real estate value in the entire 
city.122 This economic embarrassment would frame the rationale for neglecting the 
drainage problem in the city.  
In Savannah, attempts to control the deficit meant cuts in expenditures including 
the Scavenger Department, the agency responsible for sanitation. Its budget was nearly 
halved between 1875 and 1876.123 Trying to distract the citizenry from the known causes 
of the disease, and to blame the city’s lack of action on a lack of understanding, Mayor 
Anderson said that, “The origin of the epidemic is involved in obscurity, and a great 
difference of opinion exists among the physicians.”124 Ultimately, budget cuts would 
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finance the dredge and railroad upgrades for Savannah and it was this debt that allowed 
city fathers to ignore public health precautions citing financial hardship. 
Yellow Fever and Foreign Policy    
Yellow fever was as much an international problem as it was domestic. The 
Atlantic world provided a continuous flow of infected people, and the mosquitos to bite 
them, as they transported the commodities of the tropics. Once in port, some suspected, 
the infested seamen would disembark to carry with them to the taverns and brothels the 
disease that would plague the local inhabitants. As outbreaks of yellow fever were 
associated with shipping and foreign ports, great pressure was exerted on government to 
greatly impede this continuous flow. The problem, of course, was that any infringement 
in shipping cut into greatly needed revenue. 
 Savannah needed a scapegoat, and the importation theorists had a field day with 
Havana, Cuba, and Havana provided the perfect pariah.  Nominally still in Spanish 
hands, Cuba was a well-known hotbed of tropical disease, as the Spanish would learn the 
hard way. A Spanish possession since 1492, it became a key component of the West 
Indies sugar trade.  As such it drew a tremendous number of Northern Spaniards who, 
because of a lack of immunity, came to the climate at great risk to yellow fever. Between 
1868 and 1894, more than a half a million Spaniards settled in Cuba.  Likewise, a large 
military presence was required to continually quell slave and independence uprisings.  
The Spanish garrison paid a dear toll.  During the Cuban War of Independence (1895-
1898), the Spanish army lost 3,100 to combat and 41,000 to disease with yellow fever 
 61 
accounting for a full 36 percent of all military fatalities.125 This constant influx of fresh, 
non-acclimated humans meant that yellow fever was a constant and well publicized 
problem for Cuba, and with Cuban ships gracing Savannah’s riverfront on a regular basis, 
it was easy to blame Cuban shipping for yellow fever entering the city.  
 The U.S. military blamed Cuba for yellow fever. A report published in 1868 by 
the Surgeon General of the United States, clearly stated this accusation. The report states 
that Havana, Cuba and Vera Cruz, Mexico were significant sources of disease. The 
military had every right to be nervous, as the report records that during the year 1867, 
twenty-one military surgeons fell ill to yellow fever—ten died. The evidence to support 
these accusations was lacking in this report. In fact, a specific case that was cited 
contradicted the report’s own assumption. The report speaks of an officer who returned to 
Ft. Jefferson, Mississippi from Havana on July 3 or 4, 1877. On July 18, the report 
continues, the officer is “attacked” by yellow fever. Strangely, the report also states the 
Ft. Jefferson’s first case of yellow fever didn’t occur until August 18. Three problems 
emerge from this report. First, the fourteen-day timespan between arrival from Cuba, and 
the onset of the attack extends beyond all known incubation periods. Second, there is an 
obvious conflict regarding the officer’s infection and the installation records. Finally, 
with Ft. Jefferson being located south of New Orleans, a known yellow fever area, it is 
difficult to determine with any certainty that he contracted the disease in Cuba.126 
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 After the U.S. took possession of Cuba in 1898, a massive campaign ensued to 
clean up the island and thus remove the yellow fever threat to the U.S. The plan did not 
work. Waring supported such a plan as early as 1876. Defending the local origin theory 
against the quarantine requirements of the importation theory, he asserts, “The rational 
method of relief from this quarter [yellow fever] is not quarantine, but a commercial 
treaty with Spain, which would enable commissioners to enforce and remodel the 
Spanish towns, and enforce, through an effective police, sanitary laws.”127 
Local Reaction to State and Federal Initiatives 
Savannah, and the rest of the South, was still reeling from the outcomes of the 
Civil War. Intensely independent, Southern cities bristled at the interference being 
brought down on them from state and Federal authorities. Specifically, initiatives to 
establish public health boards and enforcement were met with indifference if not outright 
hostility. Also, as in modern times, urgency to solve the problem seemed only to exist 
when the emergency arose, followed rapidly by a return to indifference. Indeed, the 
successful cleansing of New Orleans by General Butler ultimately fell into obscurity. 
Author John Ellis quotes Dr. Stanford Chaillé, who in 1870, observed that New Orleans 
had “long since lapsed back into ‘filth, endless filth.’”128 Thus, the ability to sustain 
public health measures in disease-free years became difficult against economic realities. 
Early boards of health also lacked sufficient authority. At the state level, “the 
State boards of health had only advisory powers at the outset.”129 Ultimately these powers 
would expand, but it was too little, too late. Francis R. Allen argues that difficulty in 
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forwarding important public health initiatives became difficult due to the lack of 
grassroots demand. He observed, “Characteristically, public health adherents are 
nonspectacular, nonshouting, and nonparading. The public health motif is rational rather 
than emotional.”130 The business community likewise eschewed health initiatives. 
“Sanitarians worried,” states author Mariola Espinosa, “that business interests would 
always find ways to avoid costly health measures that infringed on profits.”131 Since 
public health was not representing a particular ethnic or community interest group, it 
lacked a powerful voice in city politics and, instead, was relegated to outspoken 
physicians and vigilante tactics. 
Medical societies were in favor of the creation of health agencies. In the case of 
Savannah, the Georgia Medical Society in Savannah was active in local affairs. With Dr. 
James J. Waring moving in its circles, the society was assured that it had a loud advocate 
for city cleanliness and yellow fever prevention. Thus, despite a lack of top down 
government regulation, local officials were aware of public health problems and the 
requirements needed to fix them in order to avert catastrophe.  
Dr. Julius Caesar Le Hardy, local Savannah physician, perhaps bests expressed 
the South’s distrust of government intervention in local administration. Decrying 
quarantine as a threat to commerce, this staunch Confederate stated,  
Ruined by a long and bloody war – robbed of our slave property, with our rights 
and liberties trampled upon by unscrupulous carpet-bag politicians, who have fed 
on our carcass for many years – it is time that our best men be at the wheel and 
pilot our own ship into safe harbor.132 
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This indictment of Union meddling in Southern affairs typifies the feelings harbored by 
the white elites of the South, and impacted the ability for public health measures to be 
meaningfully implemented and enforced. 
Medical Politics 
The medical debate over the cause and spread of yellow fever was complex. This 
complexity was magnified when one considers that the city’s physicians also represented 
the city’s elites who were influential outside the doctor’s office. This debate, although a 
medical debate on the surface, had deeper political implications. Margaret Humphreys, in 
her work, Yellow Fever and the South, claims that, in the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century, “A few physicians still contended that yellow fever could arise spontaneously 
out of filth…but for the most part southern physicians were agreed that yellow fever 
developed from a specific transportable poison, not a concurrence of filth, heat, moisture, 
or other non-specific factors.”133 Despite Humphreys’ claim, there is no evidence that 
Savannah’s medical practitioners had come to any resolution on this point. Evidence 
shows that the opposite was true and that most of the physicians in Savannah tenuously 
held to the local origin theory. Regardless, the record clearly shows that the debate 
remained intense and was by no means concluded. 
Perhaps the greatest political implication of the medical debate was that of 
culpability. Duffy writes that, “Since a diagnosis of yellow fever was certain to bring 
down upon the attending physician the wrath of both local newspaper editors and 
municipal officials, doctors seldom dared make this pronouncement without first 
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consulting with their colleagues.”134Dr. Waring certainly led the charge on the side of the 
local origin theory, and many other local physicians agreed. Promoting the local origin 
theory implied that localities had some responsibility for the devastating effects. Waring 
was unyielding in his attacks on the mayor and city council for their lack of sanitation 
measures. These attacks were not well received, especially by Edward M. Anderson, Jr., 
Mayor Edward C. Anderson’s son. Edward, Jr., or E.M., was the scrappy former 
midshipman of the famed Confederate blockade-runner, and deadly raider, the CSS 
Alabama. 135 ‘Eddie,’ as his former shipmates knew him, defended his father’s honor in 
the local newspapers by publishing open letters against Dr. Waring’s attacks.136 The 
argument was finally settled. 137 “Young Anderson withdrew his challenge a few days 
later but took pains to point out that Dr. Waring had forfeited the recognition due a 
gentleman.”138  
Waring was not the only disciple of the local origin theory. Dr. Le Hardy also 
called for sanitation improvements. Apparently, by 1889, the city still lacked a cohesive 
sanitation policy. In a paper read before the Medical Association of Georgia titled The 
Rational Method of Preventing Yellow Fever on the South Atlantic Coast, Le Hardy still 
called for prevention. He asserted, “The physicians who have recorded the conditions 
attending yellow fever epidemics, have spent their time and labor in vain, if they have not 
proven that yellow fever is a preventable disease, and that the means for its prevention 
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are easily within our reach. Drainage and cleanliness have been recognized from far back 
in the study of medical science as the fundamental principle in the prevention of all 
diseases.”139 The local origin theory provided no scapegoat. It held the local community 
responsible for the physical conditions that led to yellow fever. But a scapegoat is what 
the city fathers sought. 
The importation theory provided that scapegoat: Cuba. With the importation 
theory, the enemy was outside our gates, foreign and evil. “The germs of yellow fever I 
believe always to be imported,” chimed Dr. Octavius Augustus White, Savannah 
physician, “The history of no epidemic of this character seems ever complete without the 
inevitable mention of a ship from an infected port.”140 The quarantine system that would 
be put in place to fight this enemy would be difficult and expensive. Those opposing 
quarantine cited the damage to the shipping industry that it caused. The city was walking 
a tightrope on this debate. To protect its budget, the city had to reduce expenditures, 
including, they felt, sanitation measures. Unfortunately for James Cleary, and over a 
thousand others, the city chose to take a gamble and ignore its drainage system. 
The Savannah Morning News would unwittingly publish, on September 21, 1876, 
a very damning story. It reported that due to the epidemic a committee had been formed 
to evaluate the city’s sanitation and drainage. It should be noted that the committee, made 
up exclusively of physicians, did not include Dr. Waring. It should also be noted that the 
committee was formed a full month after the onset of the first reported case. The paper 
published the committee’s report, which indirectly admitted the city’s sanitary condition 
leading up to the tragedy. Referring to measures taken after the onset, the report stated 
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that, “These sanitary measures inaugurated at the very beginning of the epidemic, and 
have been uninterruptedly persevered in up to the present time, and will be continued 
without abatement until the final cessation of the sickness.”141 Two facts emerge from 
this statement. First, it indicates that sanitary measures were insufficient prior to the 
outbreak, and, second, that these measures would be discontinued once the threat was 
past. Thus the city was prepared to only react to an outbreak and not to prevent one. 
Newspaper Politics 
 Savannah’s newspapers would conspire to minimize the yellow fever threat as did 
many southeast newspapers that viciously sought readership and advertisement sales. 
Behind the newspapers were local businesses that did not want the populace to flee the 
city in fear. Ellis reveals this fear, stating, “the newspapers were aided and abetted by city 
officials in suppressing reports of disease, even in the midst of raging epidemics.”142 He 
goes on to recount the story of a health officer who, in Memphis in 1873, publicly 
asserted that his job wasn’t to be concerned with business. He was fired.143 
 Savannah was no different. In fact, the Savannah Morning News’ handling of the 
outbreak borders on laughable. Even before the outbreak began, with James Cleary’s 
death, the papers were entering the sickly season hoping to minimalize the concern. It 
was actually Dr. Falligant who tried to quell unnecessary anxiety. He wrote in the 
Savannah Morning News on July 28, 1876 that many reported cases of yellow fever have 
been misdiagnosed and that compared to 1854, the city was much healthier “in the 
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condition of the lands surrounding the city and the drainage of the city… .”144 He went on 
say that, “Fear is a great cause of fatality in disease and many a patient’s life has been 
saved by keeping him in ignorance of his danger until the danger has passed.”145 His 
sincerity is questionable for he wrote in 1878 that, “The summer of 1876 found the city 
of Savannah in a condition widely different from that of many previous years, both in a 
hygienic and thermometrical sense.”146 He continued, “From the very first I denounced 
this conversion of these conductors of water [storm drainage] into conductors of filthy 
and human excretory matters as an unwise step… but it went unheeded.”147 It would 
seem that the newspapers had a story to tell, and Falligant was willing to compromise his 
position to appease the paper’s agenda. Perhaps, however, Falligant was simply reflecting 
the public’s annual tendency to minimize the inevitable and sweep the threat under the 
rug. 
 The papers were silent for days. On August 31, Solomon Gleason recorded that; 
“The paper published a full statement of the fever this morning. It looks more 
hopeful.”148The Savannah Morning News published a story on September 1, reporting 
that Atlanta had sent them a telegraph begging Savannah to come clean with the 
epidemic’s existence.149 The paper used this statement to retort that “the facts in the case 
were not printed earlier was no fault of ours. In the confusion of the panic it was utterly 
impossible to get anything reliable, and we preferred to wait until the excitement had 
somewhat subsided, rather than give color and currency to the exaggerations that were 
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floating about the streets.”150 Later in the same issue the paper scolded city officials 
stating that the paper needed to “call the attention of our authorities to the propriety of 
having these [death] reports properly made out, and to suggest that instead of withholding 
them an entire day, the report be handed in for publication the same day.”151 One can 
only imagine that such a statement was made with a wink as the papers and the city 
partnered to sway public opinion in a deadly game of deception and misinformation. 
 September 2, 1876 dawned a new day of yellow fever in Savannah.  For the 
Morning News it was a new day to deceive a panicked city. After reporting on page three 
that, “Compared with the four previous days, the city yesterday was quiet and free from 
excitement,” they noted that, “The general sanitary conditions of the city and suburbs is 
good. Yesterday Mayor Anderson, General Anderson, Chief of Police, and Dr. 
McFarland, the Health Officer, devoted the greater part of the day looking after this 
matter in person…”152 Solomon Gleason wasn’t a believer; he sent his daughters away 
this day “at once”.153 
 On September 9, the paper published this unbelievable statement: “All excitement 
in regard to the fever has subsided, and the streets present a more cheerful appearance. It 
was reported that physicians had said that the fever was assuming a much milder 
form.”154 Gleason wrote a glaring contradiction on that day, “More sickness than any day 
before, don’t know how many deaths.”155  The paper conceded their gross error two days 
later. “The reports of the last two days, Saturday and Sunday, are not favorable,” it said 
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on page three, “showing that the fever is not abating and that the health of the city is very 
bad.” This overt distortion of the glaring evidence of the epidemic, and the consistent 
burying of these stories on page three of the newspaper, demonstrates a collusion of city 
officials and the newspapers to hide the truth of a deadly outbreak from the public in 
order to protect themselves from the accusations that might erupt. 
Chapter Conclusion 
 City politics and economics impacted the city’s ability, or willingness, to address 
known threats. Decision makers were influenced by a woeful economic state, a bitter 
medical debate, and a newspaper conspiracy that distracted them from the impending 
danger. 
 The city’s economic state was miserable as 1876 loomed. By investing heavily in 
the city’s transportation infrastructure, the city incurred a debt that could not be paid off. 
Public works projects, although hugely effective in thwarting yellow fever in the war 
years and beyond, could not be maintained. This neglect did not go unnoticed or 
unreported. Lisa Denmark writes that Dr. Waring “openly criticized the administration 
for allowing preventative measures decline for the sake of economy.”156 
 The medical debate spilled over into public life. This debate—whether or not 
yellow fever was a foreign disease brought to our shores on ships, or a local disease bred 
in the waste and brackish water of Savannah’s swamps and canals—carried great political 
importance. Cuba provided an adequate scapegoat, but only at the risk of other political 
challenges, namely the expense and commercial risk of quarantine. With several 
physicians holding public office, the debate would draw political lines and continue to 
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hinder sound public health practices. The hesitancy to abide by Federal or state pubic 
health initiatives impacted Savannah’s willingness to adopt standards from without its 
borders. 
 The newspapers’ deceitful reporting was an obvious violation of the public trust. 
Any actual collusion of the papers and city officials is conjectural, however attempts by 
the paper to minimize the emerging pandemic are self-evident. Politically, the papers 
sought to maintain the status quo. By glossing over the yellow fever outbreak, they 
gained the tacit support of the city’s political elites and the advertising revenue of the 
city’s business community. The victim of this alleged collaboration was the community, 
who were dying at a faster rate as the days progressed. 
 Politics did not cause yellow fever. The behavior of the city’s elected and 
administrative officials, however, greatly altered the city’s ability and willingness to take 
preventative measures. Had this been any average summer they may have won the 
gamble, but with conditions measurably ripe for disaster, prevention was clearly 










CHAPTER SIX: SOCIAL CONDITIONS IN SAVANNAH 
 
 Socially, Savannah was also at risk. As with most post-bellum Southern societies, 
the city was socially fragile. The ‘peculiar’ institution of slavery remained the framework 
of life and work as colored people integrated into white society. In a city that was trying 
desperately to emerge on top of Georgia’s economic ladder, however, care for the poor 
became no more a priority than drainage and sanitation.  
 In the pre-epidemic years, social fragility would emerge in the form of a struggle 
between classes. In the interest of developing a positive city image that would draw 
visitors and, more importantly, business, the city wanted to continually improve its 
aesthetics.  White elites were very sensitive to unsavory environments. Crime and 
nuisance behavior was on the rise in 1870.  Drunkenness, prostitution, street vending, and 
a host of other public nuisances associated with increasing population compelled the 
prosperous to call for change. One of those changes involved the enforcement of trade 
restrictions that forbade the trade between blacks and white on Sundays.157 After 
replacing the decaying city jail, that incidentally increased the city’s well-established 
debt, Mayor Screven was faced with an incident whereby two cases of “black people who 
had died ‘upon the public thoroughfares’ provoked an outcry….”158 Screven needed to 
remove public eyesores, whether human or otherwise, and thus he embarked on his 
public works plan. His plan of action would make his city further vulnerable to yellow 
fever’s death knell. 
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City Services and the Poor 
City services often omitted the city’s poorer classes. In the case of the Mayor’s 
sewer project, it bypassed sections of the city that would soon fall victim to the yellow 
fever scourge. Although street paving and other surface improvement were made during 
Screven’s administration, it was the sewer and drainage work that most directly 
influenced the risk of yellow fever. 
Savannah’s sewer and drainage system was inadequate, especially as it related to 
non-elites.159 Author Werner Troesken, in The Journal of Economic History, writes that 
in the South sewer and water systems were constructed along class and ethnic lines. 
Using Savannah, Georgia as a case study, Troesken examines demographic patterns in 
the city and how sewer and water were provided to them. Although his study focuses on 
sewer improvement in Savannah starting in 1898, it can be safely inferred that 
improvements of the system followed previous paradigms, and, since the improvements 
clearly did not improve services to the African-American population in Savannah after 
1898, it can be safely argued that the African-American population was not adequately 
served before 1898. The period following the upgrade, the author asserts, “there is strong 
evidence that once Savannah authorities did respond to the threat of epidemic disease 
they provided poorer service to black neighborhoods than to white neighborhoods.”160  
Walter Frasier, Jr. echoes Troesken’s claim. Speaking of sewer and water services 
following the 1854 outbreak, he says that, “in providing services first to well-to-do 
residents, it was much like other cities. Over three years after it first provided water to 
affluent neighborhoods and only after strong protests did the government lay water mains 
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and begin pumping water into Oglethorpe Ward, which was densely populated with poor 
whites and blacks.”161  
Medical Care and the Poor 
 Medical care seldom reached the poorer classes. In the years before public 
welfare the poorer classes were treated at the whim of local physicians who would, or 
would not, provide free medical care. With no system or program in place, the poor were 
at particular risk at contracting disease and not being treated for it. The city’s budget 
could hardly pay for an extensive system of care, however, even when the city was made 
aware of the problem, not even basic measures were taken to solve the problem. 
 Medicine in Savannah was dominated by white elites. This group of  physicians 
were all serving as owners of private practices and thus had their own list of patients to 
look after. There is no evidence that local physicians actually denied medical care to the 
poor. In fact, during the epidemic, there seems to be no overt racial or socio-economic 
undertone, however, no single agency or organization had taken responsibility for the 
holistic surveillance of the city’s healthcare. Many were left without even basic medical 
services. 
 On April 4, 1873, a petition was submitted to the Mayor and City Council that 
demonstrates the plight of the poor in relation to medical care. The petition, signed by 
eleven ministers of local black churches, “and others,” stated “how great the poverty of 
the said poorer classes, and how real is their inability to provide for themselves proper 
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medical treatment when such a must is necessary.”162 The petition goes on to 
acknowledge the gratis labor of the local doctors under the umbrella of the Georgia 
Medical Society; however, the petitioners had one request: they wanted the city to hire a 
“resident city physician… on whom the pauper may confidently call in the hour of 
extreme illness.”163 The ministers also draw a direct connection between this lack of care 
and survivability during disease outbreak. Referring to the fall and winter of 1872, during 
which an unspecified presumed disease outbreak occurred, they implore that “hundreds 
of the poor suffered indescribably, and many died… from want of the personal services 
of such an officer [physician].”164 They continue, saying that the lack of proper advice 
and treatment from a dedicated doctor prompted “the afflicted to have recourse to 
treatment of a nature better calculated to destroy than to preserve life and health.”165 
 The petitioners received their answer. In an undated, unsigned scrawling on the 
original petition, the city replied: 
The Health and Cemetery to whom was referred the application of certain colored 
members of the gospel for the appointing of a city physician to render pauper 
patients beg have to report that they have given the same due consideration of and 
that they deem such an appointment unexpedient.  
First, the finances of the city do not support the creation of any new 
offices. 
 Second the poor are amply supplied medicines from the city dispensary 
and thousands are annually attended by the physicians of the city without fee or 
reward.166 
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It was not only benevolent organizations that recognized the plight of the poor, or who 
felt the callousness of the city’s administration. 
White physicians also acknowledged the lack of adequate healthcare for the city’s 
poor. In a letter from the Georgia Medical Society to the Savannah City Council, Dr. T.J. 
Charlton requested city intervention, requesting that a physician be identified by the city 
for each of the city’s two districts to care for the poor. The letter debunks the city’s reply 
to the ministers’ petition saying that, “while ample provision has been made for 
supplying the sick poor with medicines at the expense of the city, no provision whatever 
has been made for the supplying them with medical attendance.”167 The letter goes on to 
claim that, “this system has doubtless been the cause of much suffering, and in some 
instances death, which might have been prevented by the timely attendance of a 
physician, many persons feeling a delicacy in calling upon a professional man for 
gratuitous services and hence delay until the case becomes dangerous, and the result is 
death or a long painful illness.”168 
Chapter Conclusion 
Vulnerability of the poor to disease, from the standpoint of healthcare, was not 
solved by the time the 1876 sickly season rolled around. Instead, an overall unhealthy 
population of people, without medical care, would fall victim.  
 The poor, consisting mostly of freedmen, were a vulnerable population. 
Underserved by city services, they were geographically located where disease was 
believed most likely to strike: the city’s wet and filthy wards. Denied adequate drainage 
and sanitation, these areas would be perfect breeding ground for the mosquito. It is no 
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surprise, then, that a young, probably malnourished child named James Cleary would first 
fall victim in a poor sector of the city.  
It was not just sanitary conditions that would threaten the poor. Medical care was 
spotty, crisis oriented rather than preventative, and not centrally organized. The petition, 
and its reply, describes a city that was socially vulnerable to yellow fever. Both of these 
social conditions were preventable, either by the direct application of funds, or in the 
financial crisis it was in, by creative management of scarce resources. It is apparent, that 
despite its financial hardship, the city was able to clean things up during the crisis 
demonstrating that it would have been able to do so as the sickly season approached and 

















 The yellow fever epidemic of 1876 in Savannah, Georgia was preventable. Truly 
this is a regrettable argument given the tragic circumstances. On September 21, 1876, one 
month to the day after the epidemic broke, the Savannah Morning News declared, “the 
authorities, upon the first announcement of yellow fever, promptly, and without a day’s 
delay… cleaned out… the entire city.”169 This sudden attention to cleanliness was too 
little, too late. The city was wrecked by yellow fever and faced a long recovery.  
 Yellow fever was not entirely the fault of Savannah’s municipal government or of 
the South. The yellow fever virus was unseen and not entirely understood. No amount of 
measures could have prevented yellow fever from arriving on Savannah’s shores. Let it 
be clear that the virus originated in Africa and spread to the New World through the 
abundance of slave and commodity trade that permeated the southwest trade routes. 
Yellow fever struck the South every year throughout the seventeenth, eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. Often, it broke out into epidemic proportions. What was preventable 
in Savannah was the spread of yellow fever through the management of the physical 
environment. 
 It is also unfair to accuse Savannah’s leadership of not recognizing the mosquito 
threat. Although there were suspicions of insect involvement as early as the late 
eighteenth century, there was insufficient acknowledgement of that suspicion and no 
scientific rationale to suspect it. Local leaders and public health officials should not have 
identified the connection between a mosquito and disease epidemic. It is perfectly 
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rational, therefore for the two theories, local origin and importation, to flourish within the 
community for whatever political end the theories supported.  
 Savannah decision-makers, however, knew and understood significant 
information about their physical environment that should have alerted them to the threat. 
First, they knew their climactic state, the climate’s relevance to yellow fever, and the 
weather conditions of August 1876. 
 It was well known and circulated that the southern Unites States was teeming with 
disease. Although yellow fever struck the northern cities in the eighteenth century, the 
end of that disease in the north was attributed to the end of slavery in the north and the 
hot and humid climate of the south. It was also known and understood, that the sickly 
season began in late summer, towards the end of July, and ended with the first harsh 
frosts of November. The general populace anticipated the sickly season. Disease 
visitation was observable and unmistakable. To that end, 1876 was uniquely vulnerable. 
Heavy rains in the spring followed by an unusually hot and humid summer was observed 
and documented by the newspapers and even the local citizen. All these factors would 
lead any citizen or official to recognize an unusual threat in 1876. 
 Second, Savannah decision-makers knew and understood the relationship between 
community cleanliness and disease propagation. Regardless of which yellow fever theory 
one subscribed to, the end result was the same; disease was directly related to sanitation 
and drainage.  
 The natural topography of the area was well known to be a drainage problem. 
This is evidenced in the dry culture program that essentially eradicated rice plantations 
and put certain low areas, such as the Springfield Plantation under city control. To the 
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public health and medical sectors, these low-lying marshy areas were the cause of rotting 
vegetation and animal remains. The resultant foul odor, or poisonous miasma, was 
believed to be a significant cause of yellow fever. The refusal of the city to manage the 
waters trapped in the Springfield Plantation was criminal. Concerned physicians were 
ignored despite the call to abide by city procedure and drain the planation. 
Man-made water management structures were known to harbor filth and standing 
water. The Bilbo Canal was notorious for sanitation problems, yet, like the Springfield 
Plantation, it was left unmanaged and poorly maintained. Dr. James Waring’s protests to 
this end are sufficient evidence of the city’s awareness of this threat to health. Although 
many examples have been examined, Waring’s opinions were played out before the City 
Council, the courts and in the newspapers. Again, the relationship between drainage and 
the mosquito was not known, but it didn’t have to be. The community as a whole was 
fully aware of the suspected threat of poor drainage and sanitation as well as the fact that 
nothing was being done to address that threat. Le Hardy would claim that, “Experience 
has proven that these two measures by themselves will prevent yellow fever.” 170 
But why, in light of a known threat to the safety of the community, were these 
physical factors ignored? What contributed to theses fatal decisions? These questions 
were answered in light of the economic and political conditions in the city as well as 
certain social conditions. 
Politically, the city was in the stranglehold of a bad economic situation as well as 
medical, foreign policy, and public health issues. Each of these conditions, in some way, 
led officials away from taking definitive preventative measure on the eve of the outbreak. 
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The economic depression of 1873 deepened an already bad economic climate in 
the city. The significant debt that was amassed from various public works projects and an 
inordinate investment in railroads was exacerbated by this downturn. The city was 
operating on a shoestring, and taxpayers were weary of the debt burden being passed 
down to them in the form of taxes. In turn, budgets were cut, including monies targeted 
for sanitation, namely the Scavenger Department. This lack of funding was blamed by the 
city for its failure to maintain the sewer system and enforce sanitation violations. 
The medical debate over the cause and spread of yellow fever also contributed 
political complexity and a lack of preventative measures. Several influential physicians, 
namely Dr. Waring, held close to the local origin theory whereby the city was held 
responsible for the conditions that were felt to cause the fever. 
The importation theory, which held that yellow fever was brought to the city from 
an external source, was popular with city officials, the general public, and most notably 
the newspapers. Importation theorists called for quarantine measures to be invoked that 
would force ships arriving from foreign ports to be held while inspected for sick sailors. 
Although on the surface quarantine provided some political cover, it also exposed the 
already cash-poor city to significant costs. The medical controversy over the cause of 
yellow fever was being debated in the public square, but again, the argument is moot 
when you consider that both sides of the debate acknowledged the role of sanitation and 
drainage. 
Social conditions in the city also indicated a unique threat to the city in 1876. 
Sewer systems that, if maintained, would have reduced the threat, by-passed underserved 
populations and medical care was not adequately being provided to the poorer classes. 
 82 
Both of these social conditions were worsened with the steady increase in population and 
resultant crowded conditions. Mayor Screven recognized the value of making sewer and 
drainage improvements in the early 1870s in order to present a better picture of the city to 
investors. White elitism interfered with an equal distribution of these services. Sewers 
were targeted for the affluent that were the most vocal against filth and odor. This 
omission of sewer services to the poor placed them at risk. An equal distribution of sewer 
and water would have helped protect the city as a whole from tragedy. 
Unequally applied medical services also interfered with yellow fever resistance. 
The poorer classes had no direct access to health care. Local physicians provided care for 
no fee, but there was no system to ensure even gratis services were rendered equally. 
Blacks were particularly vulnerable. As with any disease, poor health increased the 
mortality of yellow fever, and therefore the poor were at risk. City records only identify 
the dead by race, not by social standing. Of the 1,066 officially recognized deaths, only 
257 were listed as colored.171 This is surprisingly low, but it reflects the low mortality of 
yellow fever on the black population. What is not recorded is the actual number of cases. 
Although blacks got sick, they did not die at the same rate as whites. 
It is easy for the researcher to examine the evidence, and draw the conclusion that 
Savannah’s epidemic could have been prevented. The challenge is to craft a solution. 
What should they have done? And, perhaps more importantly, what could they have done 
given the conditions at the time? 
Clearly, the city should have reduced the amount of standing water in the city. 
This would have helped eliminate the poisonous miasma that they feared was spreading 
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yellow fever, while improving the city’s overall appeal. In actuality, it would have greatly 
reduced the proliferation of mosquito larvae. To accomplish this reduction, the city had 
several actions at its disposal. First, it should have maintained the sewers and canals as 
prescribed by city procedure. This constant flushing with fresh seawater would have 
eliminated standing water, and horrible stench, in these waterways. Second, the city 
should have drained the Springfield Plantation in preparation for the sickly season. Dr. 
Waring’s drastic move to take that matter into his own hands is indicative of the severity 
of the problem. Finally, in advance of the sickly season, the city should have funded the 
scavenger department in order to provide general cleanliness and sanitation to the city. 
These three actions would not only have both greatly reduced the yellow fever threat, but 
also would have improved city aesthetics that was a concern all along. Unfortunately for 
the citizens of Savannah, that dark summer, their lives were traded for the ugly side of 














On November 14, 1876, the epidemic in Savannah was declared over. In its wake 
were crowded cemeteries and economic destruction. Solomon Gleason died of yellow 
fever on October 3, 1876. By the time of his death he was broke. “My Business is 
ruined,” he wrote on September 4, “and I find myself a poor man.”172 In the 1877 annual 
report the city formally recognized the benefit of cleaning up the city. Spending 
$7,973.68 in further dry culture improvements, the report admitted, “While this is a large 
outlay in the present condition of the city’s finances, it is believed it will be justified by 
improving the general health.”173 But by 1879, the memory of 1876 had already faded. In 
a supplement to the mayor’s report in 1879 it was sadly reported that conditions had 
returned to an abysmal state.174 
The widespread epidemic of 1878 devastated the country and was responsible for 
bringing considerable attention to the yellow fever threat. Two significant initiatives were 
results of this outbreak. First, the Quarantine Act of 1878 was passed. This law was a 
long time in coming. As has been discussed, this issue was hotly debated and congress 
was slow to take a side. The 1878 outbreak caused political pressure that could not be 
resisted. Second, legislation was pursued in Congress to form a Federal health board. 
This bill (S.R. 1462), sponsored by Senator Lucius Q.C. Lamar (D., Miss.), called for the 
formation of a bureau of public health at the Federal level. This legislation was hotly 
contested and battle lines were formed between Dr. Woodworth, an importation theorist 
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and quarantine supporter, and a coalition of the American Public Health Association and 
the American Medical Association. The battle would cost Woodworth his life, likely by 
suicide. Ultimately, the bill failed, and the formation of a Federal level public health 
entity remained elusive.175 It was twenty-two years later that it was discovered that Aedes 
aegypti was the culprit.  
It was Dr. Jesse Lazear, bacteriologist and associate to the renowned military 
physician, Dr. Walter Reed, who would make the discovery. Reed, who doubted the 
mosquito theory, sent Lazear to Havana to conduct further studies on yellow fever. 
Through a series of experiments, that included the self-induced infection by a yellow 
fever carrying mosquito, the theory was confirmed. On September 18, 1900, Lazear fell 
ill with yellow fever. He died several days later. Subsequent meetings of the American 
Public Health Association and the American Medical Association in 1902 and 1903 
respectively unanimously agreed that the mosquito was the carrier of yellow fever.176 At 
last the code was broken.  
After this discovery, however, yellow fever would still visit the South until the 
last serious outbreak in New Orleans in 1905. Yellow fever would cost the lives of 
100,000 people in America as it ran its course.177 Mosquito control through drainage 
management became the norm and the South was finally released from the grip of fear. In 
1905, Shreveport was fumigated.178As late as 1943, the Savannah-Chatham County 
Health Department had formed an Aedes aegypti Control Unit to protect the war industry 
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and military presence in and around Savannah.179 These efforts succeeded. Yellow fever 
was over. 
Correctly executed, historical analysis of historical events, such as Savannah’s 
outbreak, can be a useful tool for decision-makers and should be applied to modern 
policy and practice. This approach is long overdue in the domain of emergency 
management and response. The Savannah story serves as an exemplar of how this 
application could be made and what can be learned. 
Savannah’s yellow fever epidemic cannot be applied loosely to any and all 
epidemic disease outbreak. Care must be taken to avoid oversimplification and other 
pitfalls of applied history. Done correctly, however, there are clear lessons to be learned. 
The biggest lessen to be learned is the need for broad community monitoring for 
indicators of disaster threat. Economic monitoring can identify certain high-risk groups 
that, given a poor economic condition, may be denied appropriate services. If budget cuts 
are made, who might be at risk? Targeted remedial actions may be able to be funded 
when a specific group can be identified. In Savannah’s case, perhaps the city could not 
have afforded medical care for the poor year round, but perhaps in July and August a 
cost-effective arrangement could have been made. Imagine how such an economic 
surveillance could have positively impacted the results of hurricane Katrina on New 
Orleans. 
Political indicators may be difficult to identify in real time, but political decisions 
can be monitored for vulnerability impacts. Politicians anxious to place blame on external 
vectors may distract officials from identifying other factors or the real culprit. The Cuban 
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threat was a mere distraction to the public who should have been cleaning out their 
privies and eliminating standing water around their property. Certainly these cleanliness 
issues were raised to the public, but the attempt by the newspapers and public leaders to 
draw attention to a foreign threat, meant less time and attention to local conditions. 
There is great potential for additional research. Additional events from the past 
must be given scholarly attention and a catalogue of events assembled that have high 
yield potential for contemporary and future problem-solving and policy making. This 
challenge requires a careful analysis of what the current problem space is and what events 
in the past have appropriate relevance. Much like the relationship between historian and 
military commander, the interaction of historian and emergency management operator 
will be a good and important interaction.  
Academia will be a critical factor for the success of this endeavor. Higher 
education institutions must embrace the importance of such research and bring credibility 
to an academic discipline in disaster history. The model for such a relationship exists 
within the military and can be easily adapted to the civilian domain. Practitioners of 
emergency management are faced with near-term government requirements and the need 
to find funding. Seldom is the typical emergency manager acknowledging the past. 
Although using the military model as a beginning point, it will also be a challenge to 
create a unique discipline based on its own merits and needs. However, the use of the 
military model as a beginning point should not be marginalized. 
There is also great potential for innovative and very useful tools to emerge from 
disaster-oriented applied history. Software development has evolved to the extent that 
various community factors, and their historic cousins, can be brought together in user-
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friendly formats for real time historical analysis during emergencies. In the urgent 
emergency environment, rapid access is critical, and interesting commercialization 
opportunities exist. 
This thesis creates an exemplar for future research. By engaging in this important, 
yet completely untouched domain, exciting opportunities exist to explore the historical 
record and redeem the death of James Cleary and his 1,065 fellow victims of the yellow 
fever epidemic of 1876 in Savannah, Georgia.  
This epilogue fittingly ends with the diarist, Solomon Gleason. On September 22, 
1876, he first wrote of “feeling badly.” On September 28, he wrote his last entry. “Came 
home around 5 P.M. with a head cold,” he wrote, his handwriting shaky, “got things 
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